Volume 32, Issue 1

An integrated approach of the topics ‘population’, ‘energy’ and ‘climate’ results in conclusions contrary to public opinion. Population growth will lead to disaster ten times faster than global warming. 2.5 billion people in the poor countries account for a population growth of one billion every 12 years. Fertility rates decrease with increasing gross domestic products (GDPs). Increasing GDPs correlate with increasing energy consumption. Wind power and solar energy are too expensive for the poor countries. Low-price energy can only be produced with coal, gas, oil and uranium. Therefore, many more coal-fired power stations and nuclear reactors need to be built and hopefully population growth will slow down. Once population is stabilized environmental issues can be addressed.

It is evident that the problem of global climate change is closely bound up with questions of distributional justice, both intra- and intergenerational. Questions of justice are raised by two kinds of burdens: reductions in the emission of greenhouse gases, and the financial and knowledge transfers necessary to enable the poorest countries to compensate the harms suffered by the ongoing process. Both burdens involve considerable costs and opportunity costs. On the backdrop of a prioritarian version of utilitarianism, it is argued that the answer should be a split strategy. While reduction of emissions should be based on the polluter-pays principle, obligations of compensation should be based on the criteria of overall economic strength.

The aim of this paper is to question the utilitarian hegemony in recent discussions about global climate change by defending the possibility of a contractualist alternative. More particularly, I will raise and try to answer two questions. First: How can we justify principles of climate justice? As opposed to the utilitarian concern with maximizing general welfare, a contractualist will look at the question whether certain principles are generally acceptable or could not reasonably be rejected. Second: What do we owe to future generations in these matters? Three principles of climate justice are suggested: a sufficiency principle securing basic human rights, a principle of justice giving each generation a right to realize its conception of justice, and a principle of reciprocity requiring us to take responsibility for the reception of benefits and the causation of harm.

This paper argues that climate migration-in case of climate refugees in a strict sense-differs from other forms of migration not only by its finality but also by the fact that entire communities are forced to resettle elsewhere. For such communities to migrate with dignity-that is in a way that protects the social bases of their self-respect-their host countries are required to ensure the necessary institutional arrangements enabling these people to become full and equal members within a reasonably short time. Ensuring that their equal participation rights are not merely formal but have ‘fair value’ requires taking cultural differences into account to ensure that they do not pose substantial disadvantages for participation in the political and social sphere.

Frank Knight (1921) famously distinguished the epistemic modes of certainty, risk, and uncertainty in order to characterize situations where deterministic, probabilistic or possibilistic foreknowledge is available. Because our probabilistic knowledge is limited, i.e. because many systems, e.g. the global climate, cannot be described and predicted probabilistically in a reliable way, Knight’s third category, possibilistic foreknowledge, is not simply swept by the probabilistic mode. This raises the question how to justify possibilistic predictions-including the identification of the worst case. The development of such a modal methodology is particularly vital with respect to predictions of climate change. I show that a methodological dilemma emerges when possibilistic predictions are framed in traditional terms and argue that a more nuanced conceptual framework, distinguishing different types of possibility, should be used in order to convey our uncertain knowledge about the future. The new conceptual scheme, however, questions the applicability of standard rules of rational decision-making, thus generating new challenges.

This paper aims to show that modeling complex systems inevitably involves non-propositional knowledge and thus the uncertainties associated with the corresponding model predictions cannot be fully quantified. This is exemplified by means of the climate system and climate modeling. The climate system is considered as a paradigm for a complex system, whereby the notion of complexity adopted in this paper is epistemic in nature and does not equate with the technical definition of a complex system as for example used within physics or complexity theory. The epistemic notion of complexity allows to view the climate system as complex with respect to some features, while simple with respect to others. This distinction is of practical significance for political decision making as it allows to treat some climate predictions as (fairly) certain, while acknowledging high uncertainties with others.

In this contribution we take a look at the development of environmental concern and mobility behavior of the population in Germany and Switzerland. The proportion of survey participants who express concern about the state of the natural environment is high in both countries. However, this proportion did not increase during the last two decades despite the ongoing public debate about environmental issues. At the same time the demand for private transportation did increase in Germany by almost 20% (in Switzerland by 2.5%). However, fuel consumption per capita decreased in Germany by 6.5% and in Switzerland by 2.2%. Our time series analyses of these trends suggest that this reduction is due to the price increase of gasoline which was substantial in both countries and not due to any change in attitudes. We argue that further price increases are appropriate means to reduce fuel consumption. However, our analyses also show that the price elasticity for fuel is low.

A variety of theoretical approaches have been taken in an attempt to understand, explain, and promote pro-environmental behavior. The present article gives an overview, including specific applications, and identifies and discusses various strategies used by researchers to deal with the availability of different approaches. The overview includes elementary rational choice theory, the theory of planned behavior, norm-activation theory, theories of habitual behavior, and theories within a social dilemma framework. Strategies identified are ‘extending existing theories by single explanatory factors’, ‘comparing theories’ in a competitive manner, and ‘combining theories’ in an integrative manner. It is argued that research would benefit from more standardization in empirical applications, from more competitive theory testing as opposed to integrative theory testing, and from an evaluation of approaches on theoretical grounds as opposed to focusing solely on empirical performance.

This article discusses German and European climate policy, inquiring mainly whether the ambitious goals the EU has set itself can be achieved via the instruments presently employed for the purpose and whether these instruments are efficient. In particular we discuss shortcomings of the European emission trading system, we further level criticism at energy policy measures, notably subsidization for renewable energy sources and the overlap with emissions trading. Further we argue that while 20% reduction of CO 2 is feasible at a reasonable cost, derived targets such as a share of 20% of renewable energy and 20% efficiency increase is expensive and not necessary. Finally, we scrutinize the latest climate-protection package proposed by Germany’s environment minister.

This article examines the efforts of the Obama administration and many other actors-ranging from non-governmental organizations, municipalities, and state governments to some Congressional representatives-to put the United States back on track towards international climate leadership. Efforts to shift policy direction, however, still face many hurdles. Over the course of the better part of a decade or more, climate skeptics and policy change opponents were able to seed doubt about the urgency of the issue in the public’s mind, establish new organizations and strategies to fight against climate action, and institutionalize serious obstacles to meaningful policy change.