Volume 59, Issue 1

This paper explores Sextus Empiricus’ critique of induction, with a particular focus on his arguments against universal grammatical rules in Against the Grammarians (M1 221–227). Sextus challenges the grammarians’ reliance on induction to establish universal theorems, arguing that such rules cannot reliably be established from either exhaustive or partial examination of linguistic cases. By dismantling both perfect and imperfect induction, Sextus highlights the limitations of grammarians’ methodology and questions the very possibility of universal grammatical rules. The analysis also examines Sextus’ conclusion that linguistic correctness is determined by the common usage of the speaker’s community rather than by universal principles. This position intriguingly aligns with modern discussions of linguistic rule-following, particularly Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein. Both Sextus and ‘Kripkenstein’ emphasize the contextual and communal basis of rule-following, rejecting the notion of objective, universal linguistic rules. The paper further considers whether Sextus’ critique is consistent with his broader skeptical methodology, which avoids dogmatic conclusions. While his arguments against induction may seem dogmatic at first glance, they ultimately aim to induce suspension of judgment and to undermine the dogmatism of grammarians. However, they involve disregarding both the inductive method and universal linguistic rules in ordinary life. The final section explores how an Alexandrian grammarian, such as Apollonius Dyscolus, might respond to Sextus’ critique. The grammarian’s most viable defense lies in conceding that grammar, like other empirical disciplines, is not exact and cannot achieve absolute universality. This means recognizing that Sextus’ criticism is partially on target.

In Protagoras 352a8-357e2, Socrates proposes to show that knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, 352c3; φρόνησις, 352c7) has the power to guide action even in the presence of passions such as anger, pleasure, pain, love, or fear (352b7-8). On this view, no agent in possession of knowledge of what is best for her in a given situation will fail to act on that knowledge, despite the pressure exerted by competing desires or emotions motivating her to choose an inferior course of action. Socrates’ view is usually taken by commentators to be grossly counterintuitive: humans are thought to act also on non-rational, rather than exclusively on rational desires. In this paper, I aim to show that criticism of Socrates’ argument along these lines is misguided, and to defend the view that, if we understand knowledge in the sense that Socrates proposes in this argument, i.e. as the ‘art of measurement,’ his view that knowledge is stronger than the passions is far more plausible than is generally assumed. In sections  I-IV, I revisit the vexed question of the precise nature of the absurdity Socrates attributes to the view of most people that, while they know what is good for them, they fail to act on it because they are overcome by pleasure (355d1-3). Next, in sections V-VI, I discuss Socrates’ alternative explanation for the problem of poor choices, according to which errors in the choice of pleasures and pains are due to lack of knowledge of a specific kind (episteme metretike, 357d3-7). In Section VII, I consider briefly the conclusions Socrates draws from his argument, and finally, in section VIII, I defend his alternative explanation as a viable solution to the problem of poor choices. While Socrates does not develop this position in the Protagoras , I believe it can be shown that, when an agent possesses knowledge of the good irrespective of its temporal proximity to or distance from the moment of action, then it is at least plausible to expect that she will act in accordance with it, even if she has a strong desire to act contrary to her motives.

In the Posterior Analytics , there are at least three types of first principle from which the demonstrative sciences proceed: axioms, definitions, and hypotheses. Of these, it is perhaps most difficult to pin down what Aristotle means by a hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις). Traditionally, hypotheses have been understood as distinct existence claims (‘S exists’), yet this interpretation has significant problems, partly resulting from Aristotle’s seemingly contradictory characterizations of hypotheses (characterizations written off as ‘nontechnical’ by traditionalists). Despite these problems, however, the traditional interpretation has persisted, as its challengers have struggled to offer a compelling alternative. This paper argues for an interpretation of hypotheses that centers on their interplay with definitions. On my view, both definitions and hypotheses are predicative propositions (‘P belongs to S’) serving as premises in demonstrative syllogisms. They are distinct insofar as in definitions the predicate (a definiens) inheres in the ‘what it is’ of the subject, whereas in hypotheses the subject inheres in the ‘what it is’ of the predicate (an in-virtue-of-itself accident of that subject). Together, definitions and hypotheses bring about a demonstrative conclusion that very much resembles the hypothesis. This interpretation, while admittedly iconoclastic, is more consistent than the traditional one with more of what Aristotle has to say about hypotheses throughout the Posterior Analytics .

This article offers a fresh inquiry into Plato’s views on procreation and into the lack of a clearly defined relation in the dialogues between the biology of procreation and the negative remarks on female virtue, or, rather, vice. The focus is on the Timaeus and the often neglected Critias , with some introductory comments on an important passage from the Laws . The leading question is whether Plato’s account of the origins of sex and procreation implies some sort of female inferiority, which would then translate into the political views on marriage and reproduction. The article concludes that Plato’s biology offers no direct justification for treating the difference between men and women as a general moral difference. At the same time, the article suggests that what connects both conceptual realms is Plato’s important recourse to the artisanal model, which bypasses the inherent opacity of nature. It is no coincidence that this device is especially prominent in the treatment of sex and gender in the Timaeus–Critias .

Proclus responds to the problem of transcendence and immanence by distinguishing between the transcendent unparticipated form and the immanent participated form. Yet, at times he also distinguishes between two kinds of participated entity, one kind being immanent in the participant and the other being separate from it. I argue that the separate participated form is the common character as shared by the many participants, e.g., beauty as shared by many beautiful things. As such, it fulfills a crucial function because it is the predicate, e.g., that which is properly speaking beautiful. I furthermore discuss the implications that my reading has regarding the causal functions of the unparticipated and of the two kinds of participated.