Volume 53, Issue 1 -

The emergence of mathematical probability has something to do with dice games: all the early discussions (Cardano, Galileo, Pascal) suggest as much. Although this has long been recognized, the problem is that gambling at dice has been a popular pastime since antiquity. Why, then, did gamblers wait until the sixteenth century ce to calculate the math of dicing? Many theories have been offerred, but there may be a simple solution: early-modern gamblers played different sorts of dice games than in antiquity. While ancients diced at communal risk, early-moderns diced at individualized risk. These individual wager-games, for example, the game “hazard”, incentivized solving questions like “how likely is it to roll a triple-six?”. Before the early modern period there was no gambling game to which working out mathematical probability would have brought an advantage.

In this paper, I argue that in the Eudemian Ethics , Aristotle proposes a strong version of the unity of the virtues. Evidence in favor of this strong version of the unity of the virtues results from reading the common books within the EE rather than as part of the Nicomachean Ethics . The unity of the virtues as defended in the EE includes not only practical wisdom and the character virtues, but also all the virtues of practical and theoretical thinking. Closely related, in the EE , Aristotle proposes a different best agent from the one of the NE . The best agent of the EE is the kalos kagathos . The person who is kalos kagathos has “all” the virtues. Kalokagathia is a whole and the virtues are its parts. I investigate how we should understand this whole and the relation between the individual virtues within this whole.

The case of Gorgias’ profession has been an object of ongoing dispute among scholars. This is mainly because in some dialogues Plato calls Gorgias a rhetorician, in others a sophist. The purpose of this article is to show that a solution only emerges in the Gorgias, where Plato presents Gorgias’ goals as a rhetorician and its associated arts. On this basis, Plato introduces a systematic division between genuine arts and fake arts, including rhetoric and sophistry, thereby identifying their conceptual differences and similarities. The paper concludes by arguing that Gorgias can be called both a rhetorician and a sophist, provided that the labeling is done from different perspectives.

The article examines the passages in Isocrates’ Corpus containing a description and a critique of a new type of sophistic called “eristic”. Based on the chronology of Isocrates’ discourses and the description he gave, the author shows that the majority of these passages could not have aimed at Plato as its sole or principal target. However, it should not be excluded that Isocrates’ criticism of eristics was directed against various members of the Socratic circle, a heterogeneous group in which Plato was comprised. The article shows that although a feud between Plato and Isocrates is not an acceptable premise, a possible rivalry between both men may have been possible. Nonetheless, such a rivalry does not allow one to assimilate Plato with an eristic.