Volume 52, Issue 3 -

Does a τέχνη, qua τέχνη, need to be good-directed? On the basis of the Gorgias , many scholars have thought the answer is yes; I argue here to the contrary. There are, of course, many beneficial τέχναι, such as medicine and weaving; and there are even unconditionally good τέχναι, like the πολιτικὴ τέχνη; but Plato also happily construes piracy as a τέχνη in the Sophist , and, more normally, all sorts of neutral practices as τέχναι (e.g., drama). In order to make this argument, I provide a taxonomy of the different kinds of τέχναι and demonstrate that, across the corpus, there does not seem to be a good-directedness requirement. I then address the evidence of the Gorgias , where most commentators find a connection between τέχνη and good-directedness. I argue that this interpretation is incorrect, and that rhetoric in fact fails to be a τέχνη in the Gorgias solely because it is unable to give a rational account. A close reading of the Gorgias shows that this is a plausible interpretation, and comparison with the Phaedrus reinforces the point: in both dialogues, whether rhetoric will be a τέχνη or not hinges only on the question of rationality, not a good-directedness condition.

Plato’s Timaeus contains an argument that vice is involuntary. Here I present an interpretation of that argument and, upon doing so, relate the underlying conception of voluntariness to that found in Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics . I argue that in the Timaeus , for something to be voluntary it must be caused by the agent’s intellect ( nous ) in a certain way. This idea, in turn, relies on an identification of the agent with her intellect: the reason that what is voluntary must be caused by the agent’s intellect is that what is voluntary is what the agent herself is responsible for. The conception of the voluntary in the Eudemian Ethics differs less radically than one might think. There too Aristotle wishes to respect the idea that there is an important connection between what is voluntary and what is caused by our rational capacities, but he differs in how he fills out the relevant rational capacities.

In this article, I foreground the physiology of phantasia in Aristotle, which has been comparatively understudied. In the first section, I offer a new interpretation of the relationship between aisthēmata (sense perceptions) and phantasmata , based on passages in the De Anima and the Parva Naturalia , and for a nuanced understanding of their respective substrates in the body, which I argue to be connate pneuma and blood. In the second section, I draw out the ramifications of this physiological presence of phantasmata in the blood and compare the integration of phantasmata into a person or animal’s experiential history with the process of digestion. Both processes, I contend, require internalization of foreign elements as well as their optimal organization; more strikingly, both processes occur in the same substance, in the same location, and, perhaps, at the same time.

This paper is devoted to the Stoic definition of divination as reported by Cicero. It proposes a novel reading that coherently combines the distinct versions offered in De divinatione . Especially important is the proper understanding of the close relationship between providence, fate, and chance. I argue that the Stoic understanding of chance already contains a reference to divine will, which is why the Stoics can equally claim that divination is devoted to chance and providence. This sheds new light both on the Stoic science of divination and the systematic involvement of providence, fate, and divination in Stoic philosophy.