Band 48, Heft 3

This paper looks in detail at Erasistratus of Ceos’ theory of the triplokia , or ‘triple web’, of arteries, veins and nerves. It seeks to identify and remove some uncertainties about the nature of this theory and the problems it was intended to resolve, and to locate it more firmly within the context of his groundbreaking physiology. I argue that it was not a kind of elemental theory intended to describe what the body is ultimately composed of, but principally an account of how the arterial, venous and nervous systems interact with each other and the body’s organs at a subsensible level.

This paper raises a new interpretive puzzle concerning Socrates’ attitude towards truth in the Phaedo . At one point Socrates seems to advocate that he is justified in trying to convince himself that the soul is immortal and destined for a better place regardless of whether or not these claims are true, but that Cebes and Simmias should relentlessly pursue the truth about the very same matter. This raises the question: Why might Socrates believe that he will benefit from believing things about death irrespective of the truth, but that Cebes and Simmias will not? Why should they continue pursuing the truth? This paper argues that the relevant difference between Socrates and his friends is that Socrates is a fully accomplished philosopher, while his friends are not. This, I argue, makes Socrates an epistemic authority, and it is in virtue of being an epistemic authority that he is justified in not pursuing the truth about death. The upshot of this paper is that sometimes the demands of living well require that we abandon the pursuit of truth and knowledge.

Most scholars of Aristotle’s biology have accepted the view of D. M. Balme and Pierre Pellegrin that the History of Animals is devoid of any systematic classification of animals. I challenge this reading. I show that Aristotle can produce a taxonomy of animals kinds that are found in the essences of atomic species, or, to borrow from Plato, divide nature by the joints. I start from Aristotle’s positive views of division stated in APo. II.13–14 and how they imply a taxonomic order of a genus. I then develop my interpretation of how Aristotle can divide nature by the joints in respect to his criticisms of division in APr. I.31 paired with the methodology developed in APr. I.27–30. I conclude by illustrating that Aristotle employs this methodology to divide the genus animal by its joints in the History of Animals and how he seeks out the taxonomic order of the genus animal in that work.

At NE 10.4 1174b31–3 Aristotle illustrates his conception of the relationship between pleasure and activity with a puzzling image: pleasure is like ‘the bloom on those in their prime’. Discussion of various passages from Plato and Xenophon shows that the choice of this image arises from Aristotle’s engagement with earlier Socratic discussions of pleasure and virtue, including Plato Philebus 53c–d, where Socrates wants to use the example to help to classify pleasures as ‘changes’ or ‘comings-to-be’. In his use of the image of the ‘bloom of youth’, Aristotle reinforces his correction of the Platonic metaphysical classification of pleasure.

Many commentators have noted how the conflict in Aristotle’s account of human nature in the Nicomachean Ethics is passed on, via the function argument of I 7, to his view(s) of happiness ( eudaimonia ). But the general consensus has been that Aristotle must have a single, unified view of eudaimonia , which in turn presupposes a single, unified account of human nature. Accordingly a great deal of exegetical energy has been spent resolving the apparent conflict in the Nicomachean Ethics . Although others have maintained that there is a real and irresolvable conflict here, I believe a stronger case can be made. In addition to making this case, I argue that given Aristotle’s view of rationality, he was right to be so conflicted: our capacity for theoretical reasoning is not easily accommodated in a life governed by practical reasoning and vice-versa. What’s more, it may in fact be the case that we are driven by our nature to incompatible ends. If so, there will be no single best life for us to live. With this possibility in mind, we can see that saddling Aristotle with a fundamental inconsistency in his ethics is not necessarily disappointing or uncharitable. For if we are such complex creatures, the inconsistency is in us; and Aristotle should be commended for saving the phenomena.

This paper challenges D. J. Allan’s famous claim that Aristotle employs a ‘quasi-mathematical’ method in the Eudemian Ethics. Allan believes that Aristotle’s use of posits introduced by ‘hupokeisthō’, ‘estō’, etc. in the treatise is ultimately modeled upon, or at least inspired by, their use in mathematics. However, in this paper I show that there are substantive procedural and epistemological differences between mathematical posits and those in the Eudemian Ethics and that, in any case, there is no textual basis for Allan’s thesis. When we look outside of the Eudemian Ethics, we find, in fact, that the use of posits is a rather common argumentative strategy of Aristotle. What specifically motivates his use of posits in the Eudemian Ethics, I suggest, is his desire to meet the criteria for proper philosophical arguments set out at the end of EE I.6.