Volume 6, Issue 1

The paper provides a behavioral approach to analysis of pre-trial negotiations. This paper differs from earlier studies in that the most likely outcome forms the basis on which the parties assess their benefits and costs. This is based not on precise calculations of expected values, but on the expectations of the parties which depend on assessment of relative strengths of their case. This is modelled as an outcome of an imperfect cognitive process which is characterized by coherence based reasoning and insensitivities to actual probabilities, and legal discovery. Furthermore, the paper identifies factors which affect bargaining power and how bargaining power affects settlement amounts.

A “diplomat’s jurisprudence” was the label Professor Robert E. Hudec gave to the GATT, referring to the avoidance of legally binding commitments by its negotiators. Other nicknames (the “General Agreement to Talk and Talk” for example) were not so flattering. However, since 1995, the WTO (into which the GATT was absorbed) and its members have been involved in cleaning up that image in the way of giving the organization a legal, rules based foundation. This article examines the Hudec concept of the “diplomat’s jurisprudence” and the origins of the GATT, evaluates the organization’s evolution from its rudimentary beginnings, then determines the role of the diplomat’s jurisprudence in the modern WTO environment.

Today the world economy is immeasurably more complex, multi-faceted, and integrated than it was in the last quarter of 20th century. New financial procedures and interests have multiplied in the current trade and investment matrix. Developing countries are now rightfully taking a much greater share in global production, trade and investment. However, their level of participation in the dispute settlement system is an important aspect of academic inquiry. There are several reasons for inadequate participation of developing countries but lack of trust is at the heart of the entire debate. Division amongst the developing countries placed them in more vulnerable position. This paper focuses on reasons for poor participation of some of the developing countries in the dispute settlement understanding (DSU), problems of developing and least developed countries and points out some measures for bringing required equilibrium in the dispute settlement system so that it could be made just, fair and equitable in near future.

Labour law is widely being cited as one of the principal factors creating rigidities in industrial business and, thereby, holding back productivity growth and employment generation. However, a substantial chunk of literature disputes the “rigidity argument” on the ground that there has been a sharp growth in informal employment, which is often considered as flexible labor input as it does not fall under the purview of what is believed to be directly related with rigidity – employment protection legislation (EPL). However, given empirical evidence showing that informal worker is less productive as compared to its formal (regular) counterpart, the question arises: what motivates the employer to employ less productive worker? Using three-dimensional panel data on 28 industrial sectors between 1999–2000 and 2007–2008 across 13 states of India, our results show that the incidence of informal employment is directly linked with EPL, volatility, and labor bargaining power. We utilize instrumental variable two stage least square (IV 2SLS) to overcome the endogeneity issues. The results are robust.

Aggressive legalism, a trade policy-making strategy targeted at actively utilizing WTO rules to defend trade interests, has greatly benefited major Eastern Asian countries in past years. This paper examines whether this strategy should be promoted around greater Asia in this era. First, this paper updates the status of adoption of aggressive legalism in East Asian countries including Japan, Korea and China. Second, it looks into the current and possible future utilization of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism by selected countries which are frequent “targets” of trade remedy measures, namely India, Thailand and Indonesia. Finally, it discusses the participation of Asian developing countries in the WTO. Relying upon case studies and statistical analysis, the author finds that Asian countries’ rising image in international trade signals a trend of adopting aggressive legalism in Great Asia. This trend will undoubtedly promote the energetic development of international trade globally. However, room for more progressive participation in the WTO still exists, especially in developing countries.