Volume 2, Issue 3

In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard comparative negligence rule. Unlike standard liability rules, however, when both parties are vigilant (i.e., taking more care than is efficient), the rule provides for liability shares that depend on the parties’ degrees of vigilance. Moreover, when one party is negligent and the other is non-negligent, our rule provides for variable liability shares, that respond to both carefulness and carelessness of the parties. Our liability rule is equitable; it has no discontinuity at the efficient point where both parties are just meeting their standards of care; and it provides incentives that guarantee the injurer and victim will choose the efficient care levels. This paper does not include theorems and proofs; rather it explains the results with the aid of a simple example, laid out in an easy 3 x 3 table.

We examine a situation where asymmetric MNOs (Mobile Network Operators) are competing a la Cournot and a potential MVNO (Mobile Virtual Network Operator) is attempting to enter the market by purchasing a wholesale service from one of MNOs. We present two scenarios: (1) if the MVNO can choose the wholesale service provider first and a bargaining game is used to determine the wholesale price, the most efficient (largest) MNO is chosen as the wholesale provider; or (2) if the MNOs play an auction game to determine the wholesale provider and the wholesale price at the same time, the outcome depends on the MNOs’ cost difference. Regarding the cost difference, (a) if the MNOs’ cost difference is large, the most efficient MNO will become the wholesale provider, and (b) if the cost difference is small, any MNO can become the wholesale provider. In any case, the wholesale price is determined at each provider’s monopoly level and does not fall to the marginal cost level. Furthermore, we show that if the MVNO’s efficiency level is low and/or the MNOs have been colluding to restrict outputs, the MNOs have an incentive to (collectively or individually) refuse to provide wholesale service. This situation calls for a policy of mandating wholesale provisions. Additionally, we show that the retail-minus regulation - the simple form of the ECPR (Efficient Component Pricing Rule) - is more favorable to MNOs compared with the complicated ECPR form and that the retail price is lower under the complicated ECPR form.

In the light of today’s rampant globalization, there is an increasing need for developing a system of antitrust that serves to regulate the world market. This article describes the problems relating to the globalization of antitrust in the face of differing, and often conflicting, aims of domestic antitrust law and argues that a globally applicable system of antitrust needs to treat all state players in the global market equally by taking into account the needs of each domestic economy.Since domestic antitrust law is aimed at protecting domestic interests, a globally applicable system of antitrust must recognize the dissymmetry between the goals of antitrust in developed and developing countries, and will require a single global antitrust policy which should inform the domestic jurisprudence of all states, thereby forcing domestic authorities to also take into account the interests of foreign jurisdictions so as to not impede economic development abroad.Harmonization of antitrust should reflect the interests of the global market, which would be best regulated by a system based on a global antitrust policy that addresses the specific needs of developing economies and aims at establishing a more level playing field in the global economic arena.Owing to the self-interest inherent in state actions and domestic systems of antitrust, a neutral international body such as the World Trade Organization will need to establish a globally applicable antitrust policy, and facilitate both its initial negotiation and its enforcement.

The legal profession in India does not seem to have any significant entry barriers as are prevalent in other sectors in India. Yet litigation fails to attract talented law graduates, except those who have a parental/family background in litigation. Litigation in India is marked by the presence of small and middle-size family-run law firms who employ law graduates as juniors and may fall short of world class corporate culture. On the other hand, it is rare for a fresh law graduate to become an entrepreneur-style practitioner on their own, right after college. This is in contrast with other sectors where graduates with degrees can take a bank loan and can start an enterprise. This paper reviews the regulatory framework of how legal barriers with noble intentions makes the sustainability of new entrants almost impossible in the legal profession and thus discourage new entrants from choosing litigation as a career after college. These barriers, though not entry barriers in a strict sense, are operational barriers and include: a) restrictions on the legal form of a law firm; b) a ban on advertising; c) a ban on charging a contingent fee; d) a ban on moonlighting. The paper also looks at moral hazard associated with self-regulatory bodies viz. the Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councils. Finally, the paper makes a case for reforms in the form of doing away with restrictions to lay down a level-playing field for all practitioners and foster competition.

A number of studies have examined the relationship between tax collection and various demographic variables. However, until recently most of those studies have involved a United States sample population. The Internal Revenue Service provides demographic data for researchers on a regular basis. The present study goes beyond those studies in several important ways. For one, it uses data on Malaysia taken from the World Values database. Not much work has been done on the Malaysian tax or public finance system. Thus, the present study expands on the very limited research done on Malaysian public finance.The present study expands on existing literature in at least two other ways as well. For one, it examines how various demographics interact with attitudes toward tax evasion. Secondly, we examine several demographic variables that were not examined in prior studies.One of the questions in the World Values database asked whether it would be justifiable to cheat on taxes if it were possible to do so. Respondents were asked to choose a number from 1 to 10 to indicate the extent of their support for tax evasion. This study examines those responses, both overall and through the prism of more than 20 demographic variables. A comparison is made with other ethical issues to determine the relative seriousness of tax evasion.The study found that attitudes toward the justifiability of tax evasion often do vary by demographic variable. Tax evasion was found to be a less serious offense than homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, suicide, wife beating, accepting a bribe and euthanasia and more serious than divorce, avoiding a fare on public transport and claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled.Although the present study focuses on Malaysia, the methodology used in the present study could serve as a template for research on other countries or regions.