I analyze a model of patent races for COVID-19 vaccines under alternative liability rules. The first inventor of the vaccine gets the monopoly rent, but must assume full liability from its side effects. In this model, firms choose two kinds of investments, one for inventing a vaccine and the other for its safety. I show that firms have an incentive to overinvest in both activities under strict liability. This is contrasted with the established result established that the injurer takes socially optimal accident-preventing precaution under strict liability. This contrast comes from the competition effect. Overinvestment in inventing vaccines due to competition makes a firm overinvest in safety as well. I also argue that it is undesirable for firms to get full or partial exemption from liability, because it would reduce the incentive to invest in safety. Instead, reducing the monopoly rent by regulating the vaccine price resolves both overinvestment problems.
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Volume 11, Issue 3 - Coping with COVID-19: Legal, Economic, and Policy Perspectives
December 2020
Contents
- Coping with COVID-19: Legal, Economic, and Policy Perspectives
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Publicly AvailablePatent Races for COVID-19 Vaccines and Liability RulesOctober 28, 2020
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedAre In-Person Shareholder Meetings Outdated? The Value of Implicit CommunicationLicensedNovember 26, 2020
- Regular Issue
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedIndia’s Inequality Trap: The Role Played by Taxation Policies and AutomationLicensedDecember 2, 2020
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedThe Trade-off Between Household Expenditures and Smoking Expenditure: Pre and Post Smoking Awareness Ordinance in PakistanLicensedAugust 29, 2020
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedIn the Same Boat, but not Equals: The Heterogeneous Effects of Indirect Taxation on Child Health in Punjab-PakistanLicensedNovember 3, 2020