Volume 99, Issue 2

Abstract: This study offers a new interpretation of a well-known Aristotelian argument against some basic tenets of Plato’s theory of Ideas. The argument is formulated in Top . VI.8, 146b36–147a11. According to Aristotle, in order to be successful, certain definitions require the presence of the qualification “apparent” in the definiens ( e. g. “wish is a desire for the apparent good” and “appetite is a desire for the apparent pleasure”). Aristotle claims that for someone who believes in Platonic Ideas it would be difficult (if not impossible) to offer a definition of something apparent. The difficulty is particularly acute in the case of the apparent good. This happens because the Platonists (or at least some of them) believe that there cannot be Ideas of something apparent and that Ideas are spoken of relative to Ideas only. My reconstruction of the argument in the Topics shows that Aristotle does not purport intentionally to deceive his (Platonic) interlocutor (as some commentators claim). Nevertheless, he partly misses his target. The discussion of Aristotle’s argument leads to an analysis of philosophically important points such as the qualification “apparent”, the concept of “the apparent good”, the possibility of different types of predication, and the behaviour of relatives.

The goal of this paper is to determine how Aquinas conceives of the truth-makers of (affirmative present-tense) propositions and the relation of truthmaking. First, I show that Aquinas describes a truth-maker, to which he refers as the “cause of truth” ( causa veritatis ), in at least four ways: (i) as the “being of a thing” ( esse rei ), (ii) as a “thing” ( res ), (iii) as the “disposition” of a thing ( dispositio ), and (iv) as a “composition” ( compositio ). Then I argue, with reference to Aquinas’s theory of the transcendentals, that these four descriptions refer to different aspects of the object that a proposition is about, and that all of them are relevant for the proposition’s truth. Finally, I consider the relation of truth-making, and maintain that it should be understood as a variety of exemplar causality, but that it also involves a weak kind of efficient causality.

Abstract: This paper examines James Frederick Ferrier’s idealist argument against the realist agnosticism of William Hamilton, of the Scottish ‘common sense’ school. Particular attention is paid to Ferrier’s restricted definition of ignorance as pertaining only to what could be known, and to his claim that consciousness in itself ( sans objects) and objects in themselves ( sans awareness) are contradictory or unintelligible notions. The matter commands attention, in the first place, because this once-important debate has become virtually lost from philosophical memory due to the rapid decline in reputation that both philosophers suffered after their deaths. But second, it is worth thinking about for the light it sheds on the origins of the British Idealist movement which followed it.

This paper engages with Svavar Svavarsson’s recent essay, “Sextus Empiricus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence,” arguing against both ( i ) his interpretation of whether two rival arguments appear equipollent to the Pyrrhonist because he himself is equally persuaded by both of them, and ( ii ) his interpretation of the way in which the argument from possible disagreement is supposed to induce suspension of judgment in the Pyrrhonist. In so doing, I aim to dispel some serious misunderstandings regarding key aspects of the Pyrrhonist’s skeptical outlook and argumentative practice.