Volume 96, Issue 4

Abstract: A hypothesis first proposed in the nineteenth century has since the middle of the twentieth century been approaching mythical status. It is the hypothesis that in the course of Plato’s philosophical ‘development’, he passed through a ‘Socratic period’ in which he was principally devoted to representing the philosophy of the historical Socrates rather than his own. This Socratic philosophy is found in the so-called early dialogues and is sometimes called ‘Socratic intellectualism’. According to the myth, Plato only developed and wrote down his own philosophical position in the middle and late dialogues. In this paper, I challenge the myth, arguing that there is no external evidence to support the initial hypothesis and significant evidence for rejecting it. In fact, Plato was probably in some sense a proponent of Pythagoreanism and a ‘two-world metaphysics’ well before he wrote anything. The claim that, external evidence notwithstanding, the early dialogues actually contain a philosophical position substantially different from that of later dialogues is also unfounded. Although Plato’s thought continually developed within the context of ongoing Academic discussions, nowhere in any of the dialogues is Plato’s ‘otherworldy’ revisionist philosophy absent.

Abstract: The connection between Aristotle’s theory of science and his mature metaphysics has been discussed in a number of different ways. In this article I explore in which way the close correlation between what Aristotle calls definition ( horismos ) and explanation ( apodeixis ) is elaborated in Metaphysics VII–VIII and how this elaboration contributes to a better understanding of Aristotle’s theory of science in the Posterior Analytics . The crucial claim I try to defend is that only if we adequately understand Aristotle’s solution of the problem of the unity of form-matter-composita ( substances ) in Metaphysics VII–VII can we see, according to Aristotle, what it is exactly what we get to know if we have successfully established scientific definitions by constructing scientific demonstrations. The main idea is that general form-matter-composita, being typical subjects of scientific definitions, do not consist of form F and matter M, but rather come down to a metaphysically necessary unity of form F and the general matter-form M. This necessity flows from a partial structural identity of forms F and M and grounds explanatory relations. It is in this way that Aristotle’s mature metaphysics completes his theory of science as it is presented in the Posterior Analysics .

Abstract: This paper discusses Descartes’ and Spinoza’s epistemological approaches under the perspective of how they contribute to the project of an ethics of belief. I argue that the problem of doxastic voluntarism is only one of two issues to be addressed within an ethics of belief. Another equally important concern is the question of how we can make sure that the rational control over our judgments does not override the truth-sensitivity of our beliefs. It is against this background that I compare Descartes’ and Spinoza’s views on how we may have some rational control over our own beliefs.