Volume 90, Issue 1

This paper offers a critical examination of the notion of epistemic authority in Plato. In the Apology , Socrates claims a certain epistemic superiority over others, and it is easy to suppose that this might be explained in terms of third-person authority: Socrates knows the minds of others better than they know their own. Yet Socrates, as the text makes clear, is not the only one capable of getting the minds of others right. His epistemic edge is rather a matter of first-person authority: while others falsely think they are wise, Socrates is in a position to realize he is ignorant. By contrast with, say, a Cartesian picture, for Plato third-person authority with regard to the mind is relatively commonplace, whereas first-person authority is as rare as Socrates. I discuss the basis for this view, and some of its implications for the notion of a distinctively first-person mode of access.

It is widely-accepted that Descartes is a substance dualist, i.e. that he holds that there are two and only two kinds of finite substance – mind and body. However, several scholars have argued that Descartes is a substance trialist, where the third kind of substance he admits is the substantial union of a mind and a body, the human being. In this paper, I argue against the trialist interpretation of Descartes. First, I show that the strongest evidence for trialism, based on Descartes' discussion of so-called incomplete substances, is highly inconclusive. Second, I show that a kind of unity (‘unity of nature’), which is had by all and only substances, is not had by human beings. The fact that the proper parts of a human being, namely a mind and a body, are of different natures entails that what they compose has at most a ‘unity of composition’. And a thing cannot be a substance in virtue of having a unity of composition. Therefore, Cartesian human beings are not substances.

In several works published between 1759 and 1782, Gottfried Ploucquet developed a logical system which deviates from traditional syllogistics in several respects. The most important features – which are critically examined in this paper – comprise: The „identity-thesis“ maintaining that each affirmative proposition expresses an identity between subject and predicate. An attempt to refute some of the traditional laws of opposition. A formalization of the categorical forms by means of the „quantifiers“ ‚O‘ (for ‚Omne‘), ‚Q‘ (for ‚Quoddam‘) and the relations of identity, ‚–‘ and diversity, ‚>‘. A new theory of conversion. The „quantification of the predicate“, i.e. the consideration of certain non-categorical forms.

The aim of this article is to explore the significance of Socrates' philanthropy for the concept of piety sought in Plato's Euthyphro . First, I briefly sketch Socrates' self-ascribed philanthropy in contrast with Euthyphro's unreflecting envy. I then propose a cosmological interpretation of Plato's approach to piety, according to which piety lies in just service to gods as they produce their „all-beautiful“ work, which turns out to be the beautiful universe as a whole. Finally, it is attempted to link this cosmological concept of piety to Socrates' philanthropy, whereby Socrates' philosophical care for others reveals his likeness to the benevolent God in Plato's Timaeus .