Plato's Socrates famously claims that we want (βούλɛσθαı) rather than what we think good ( Gorgias 468bd); he also claims that we desire (ἐπıθυμɛĩν) things that we think are good, which are sometimes in fact bad ( Meno 77de). Drawing on similarities between Plato's treatment of conative and cognitive attitudes, this paper shows how Plato's various accounts of the relationship between our conative attitudes and the good account for the norm-responsiveness of our conative attitudes.
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedPlato on the Attribution of Conative AttitudesLicensedAugust 14, 2006
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedThe Arabic Sea Battle: al-Fārābī on the Problem of Future ContingentsLicensedAugust 14, 2006
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedWer oder was ist unsterblich (wenn überhaupt)? Spinozas Theorie des ewigen Teils des endlichen GeistesLicensedAugust 14, 2006
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedFilling Pembroke's Lacuna in the Oikeiôsis ArgumentLicensedAugust 14, 2006
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Requires Authentication UnlicensedRezensionenLicensedAugust 14, 2006