Volume 84, Issue 3

1. Introduction In different formulations, the principle that it is worse for a person to do injustice than to suffer it figures most prominently in three of the Socratic dialogues: the Apology, Crito , and Gorgias . To understand this principle (which I will call the “principle about justice”), and in particular to find some justification for Socrates' unwavering confidence in it, much attention has understandably centered on the Gorgias , since there Socrates does not simply assert the principle to an audience which does not respond (as in the Apology ) nor does he propose it to someone who accepts it with little resistance (as in the Crito ). Both Polus and Callicles reject it, albeit in different ways. The presence of such anti-Socratic opponents suggests that we will at last hear a defense of this central Socratic principle. When we arrive at the arguments, however, we are disappointed. Jonathan Lear calls Socrates' arguments against Callicles “among the most unconvincing arguments in the Platonic corpus“. And the arguments against Callicles are generally thought to be significantly better than the arguments that Socrates offers against Polus.

After “laying bare the basis of belief” ( fundamentalibus fidei ostensis ) with a comprehensive critique of Scripture in chapters 1–10 of his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus ( TTP ), Spinoza turns to an analysis of Scripture's positive teachings, particularly the teachings of Jesus and the Apostles (preface, 10). Spinoza's analysis reveals that the Bible is primarily concerned with teaching moral rather than speculative lessons and thus confirms his claim that reason and revelation inhabit entirely “separate domains” (preface, 10f.). As a result, “neither can be called the handmaid of the other” (XV, 180).

Hume argued against claims about the role of reasoning in moral thought that had been defended by moral rationalists. In doing so, he criticized the doctrines of the rational intuitionist Samuel Clarke (1675–1729). Clarke has not received much attention from contemporary moral philosophers, and given that rational intuitionism has long fallen out of favor, he may seem an unlikely thinker to defend. Nevertheless, attention to his writings reveals some interesting arguments. By considering how Clarke could respond to Hume's attacks, I believe we can make progress in understanding the nature of moral agency and what it is for reasons to have a justifying as well as an explanatory role.

Does logic describe something or not? If not, is it a normative or practical discipline? Is there a radical division between the practical or normative level and the theoretical or descriptive level? A discipline is theoretical, we may say, if its main propositions contain descriptive expressions, such as “is” or “have”, but no normative expressions, such as “ought”, “ought not” or “may”. A discipline is normative if its main propositions are of the form “it ought to be”. Theoretical propositions express what is , whereas practical propositions express what should be . So a theoretical discipline is descriptive and a normative discipline is prescriptive, but what does a theoretical discipline describe?

Some of the most important contributions over the past two decades to understanding Heidegger's thought have been made by philosophers writing in English and sharing the broad perspective of analytic – or, perhaps better, “post-analytic” – philosophy. With Heidegger's Temporal Idealism , William Blattner has moved this approach several important steps forward. Like others in this recent movement, he interprets Heidegger not so much in the terms of existentialism or post-structuralism, as in those of the later Wittgenstein, classical American pragmatism, and neo-pragmatism. Also like other Anglo-American interpretations of Heidegger, Blattner's (1.) focuses primarily on the Sein und Zeit era; (2.) tends to steer away from Heidegger's analysis of authenticity and toward his analysis of Dasein's everydayness; (3.) accords an especially large role to Being-with ( Mitsein ) and the They ( das Man ) in the constitution of everyday meaning; and (4.) is particularly concerned with developing a view of the foundation of “mind” and scientific knowledge in the practical abilities of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Given the obvious centrality of time in SZ , it is surprising that there have been relatively few concerted attempts to critically explicate Heidegger's view of it. Blattner's book fills this gap by focusing on Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein's “originary temporality”, as explicated in Division Two of SZ .

Robert Wardy: Aristotle in China. Language, Categories and Translation . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000. (= Needham Research Institute Studies, Bd. 2.) XII/170 S. (Michael Friedrich)