5 NATO nuclear strategy and the adoption of ‘flexible response’
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Terry Macintyre
Abstract
This chapter examines the background to the formal adoption by NATO in 1967 of the revised nuclear strategy of ‘flexible response’. By the early 1960s, the security guarantee provided to NATO members by the United States had been undermined as the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity and by the demand that its European allies strengthen their conventional forces assigned to NATO. For the Germans in particular, either the consequences of a failure of deterrence or the prospect of a conventional battle fought on their territory was too serious to contemplate. Britain clearly understood German concerns and to some extent shared them. The agreement on the revised NATO strategy represented a compromise between these respective positions. Britain was a key player in the development of NATO strategy and, with Germany, was influential in developing guidance on the use of tactical nuclear weapons by the Alliance as part of flexible response.
Abstract
This chapter examines the background to the formal adoption by NATO in 1967 of the revised nuclear strategy of ‘flexible response’. By the early 1960s, the security guarantee provided to NATO members by the United States had been undermined as the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity and by the demand that its European allies strengthen their conventional forces assigned to NATO. For the Germans in particular, either the consequences of a failure of deterrence or the prospect of a conventional battle fought on their territory was too serious to contemplate. Britain clearly understood German concerns and to some extent shared them. The agreement on the revised NATO strategy represented a compromise between these respective positions. Britain was a key player in the development of NATO strategy and, with Germany, was influential in developing guidance on the use of tactical nuclear weapons by the Alliance as part of flexible response.
Chapters in this book
- Front matter i
- Contents v
- Preface vi
- Acknowledgements vii
- List of key events, October 1964 to June 1970 viii
- List of abbreviations xi
- Introduction 1
- 1 Anglo-German relations in 1964 – continuity or change? 19
- 2 Nuclear sharing in NATO 46
- 3 The offset agreements and their impact on Anglo-German relations 73
- 4 Britain, Germany and the Harmel report 100
- 5 NATO nuclear strategy and the adoption of ‘flexible response’ 122
- 6 Britain, Germany and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 147
- 7 Détente, Ostpolitik and Anglo-German relations 174
- 8 Anglo-German relations and Britain’s policy towards the European Economic Community 199
- Conclusion 227
- Appendix 1 237
- Appendix 2 241
- Bibliography 243
- Index 253
Chapters in this book
- Front matter i
- Contents v
- Preface vi
- Acknowledgements vii
- List of key events, October 1964 to June 1970 viii
- List of abbreviations xi
- Introduction 1
- 1 Anglo-German relations in 1964 – continuity or change? 19
- 2 Nuclear sharing in NATO 46
- 3 The offset agreements and their impact on Anglo-German relations 73
- 4 Britain, Germany and the Harmel report 100
- 5 NATO nuclear strategy and the adoption of ‘flexible response’ 122
- 6 Britain, Germany and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 147
- 7 Détente, Ostpolitik and Anglo-German relations 174
- 8 Anglo-German relations and Britain’s policy towards the European Economic Community 199
- Conclusion 227
- Appendix 1 237
- Appendix 2 241
- Bibliography 243
- Index 253
