Manchester University Press
6 Violence and the contestation of the state after civil wars
Abstract
The proliferation of civil wars since the end of the Cold War and the rise of peace settlements as a way of ending them has given rise to a new phenomenon in nascent post-war states, namely pervasive low-level violence perpetrated by non-state actors that does not threaten the existence of the state, but undermines its consolidation. This chapter explores the use and purpose of non-state violence in post-civil war contexts, with a particular focus on Liberia, South Sudan and Cambodia. It makes an original, critical assessment of the instrumental nature of this non-state violence in contesting the basic structures and authority of the state. It examines the role that elites, including those embedded in new state structures, play in mobilising such violence, and the ends to which they do so. Finally, it considers mechanisms to address violence, and the extent to which they reflect elite interests. It suggests that the extension of a particular type of state-model to new post-conflict states creates a set of incentives for violence that does not contest the basic existence of the state, but rather its interaction with other forms of political power and authority.
Abstract
The proliferation of civil wars since the end of the Cold War and the rise of peace settlements as a way of ending them has given rise to a new phenomenon in nascent post-war states, namely pervasive low-level violence perpetrated by non-state actors that does not threaten the existence of the state, but undermines its consolidation. This chapter explores the use and purpose of non-state violence in post-civil war contexts, with a particular focus on Liberia, South Sudan and Cambodia. It makes an original, critical assessment of the instrumental nature of this non-state violence in contesting the basic structures and authority of the state. It examines the role that elites, including those embedded in new state structures, play in mobilising such violence, and the ends to which they do so. Finally, it considers mechanisms to address violence, and the extent to which they reflect elite interests. It suggests that the extension of a particular type of state-model to new post-conflict states creates a set of incentives for violence that does not contest the basic existence of the state, but rather its interaction with other forms of political power and authority.
Chapters in this book
- Front matter i
- Contents v
- Notes on contributors vi
- Acknowledgements viii
- List of abbreviations ix
- Introduction 1
- 1 War in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Age 15
- 2 State violence and the eliticide in Poland, 1935-49 40
- 3 State violence and China’s unfinished national unification 63
- 4 Instruments of state violence in hybridising regimes 85
- 5 Crimea as a Eurasian pivot in ‘Arc of Conflict’ 107
- 6 Violence and the contestation of the state after civil wars 128
- 7 Humanitarian intervention and the moral dimension of violence 155
- 8 Limiting the use of force 183
- Conclusions 205
- Index 220
Chapters in this book
- Front matter i
- Contents v
- Notes on contributors vi
- Acknowledgements viii
- List of abbreviations ix
- Introduction 1
- 1 War in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Age 15
- 2 State violence and the eliticide in Poland, 1935-49 40
- 3 State violence and China’s unfinished national unification 63
- 4 Instruments of state violence in hybridising regimes 85
- 5 Crimea as a Eurasian pivot in ‘Arc of Conflict’ 107
- 6 Violence and the contestation of the state after civil wars 128
- 7 Humanitarian intervention and the moral dimension of violence 155
- 8 Limiting the use of force 183
- Conclusions 205
- Index 220
