Manchester University Press
15 The Crown Agents and the CDC Group
Abstract
This chapter examines two UK-based development bodies, the Crown Agents and the CDC Group, focusing on moments of controversy surrounding these organisations’ impacts on public finances, in the UK and in its former colonies. It highlights the role these ‘development’ organisations played in managing colonial currencies and supply chains to ensure the expansion of Britain’s nascent welfare state in the immediate post-war period. Both organisations have undergone significant restructuring and repositioning since the formal end of empire, and now take centre stage in the retro-liberal aid regime under which the state exists to sponsor and facilitate the private sector. Donor states are increasingly entangled with private, for-profit agencies through a range of state–capital hybrids that may benefit donor states in the Global North and development professionals more than they do ‘beneficiaries’ in the Global South. This retro-liberal aid regime is also a ‘re-colonial’ one: development bodies established during the colonial period find success through new arrangements, but much like their colonial antecedents, do so as bearers of expertise that can address development challenges while demonstrating ‘value for money’ for the UK taxpayer and chipping away at the tax base in ‘beneficiary’ countries. The chapter thus foregrounds the colonial durabilities which are so deeply embedded within aid flows, government by contract, and even ‘value for money’ models of accountability that structure the retro-liberal aid regime.
Abstract
This chapter examines two UK-based development bodies, the Crown Agents and the CDC Group, focusing on moments of controversy surrounding these organisations’ impacts on public finances, in the UK and in its former colonies. It highlights the role these ‘development’ organisations played in managing colonial currencies and supply chains to ensure the expansion of Britain’s nascent welfare state in the immediate post-war period. Both organisations have undergone significant restructuring and repositioning since the formal end of empire, and now take centre stage in the retro-liberal aid regime under which the state exists to sponsor and facilitate the private sector. Donor states are increasingly entangled with private, for-profit agencies through a range of state–capital hybrids that may benefit donor states in the Global North and development professionals more than they do ‘beneficiaries’ in the Global South. This retro-liberal aid regime is also a ‘re-colonial’ one: development bodies established during the colonial period find success through new arrangements, but much like their colonial antecedents, do so as bearers of expertise that can address development challenges while demonstrating ‘value for money’ for the UK taxpayer and chipping away at the tax base in ‘beneficiary’ countries. The chapter thus foregrounds the colonial durabilities which are so deeply embedded within aid flows, government by contract, and even ‘value for money’ models of accountability that structure the retro-liberal aid regime.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Front Matter i
- Contents v
- List of figures vii
- List of tables x
- Notes on contributors xi
- Preface xiv
- Acknowledgements xix
- Introduction 1
-
Part I: Institutional and fiscal issues
- 1 The great gage 19
- 2 The cost of thrift 37
- 3 Madagascar and French imperial mercantilism 57
- 4 The right to sovereign seizure? Taxation, valuation, and the Imperial British East Africa Company 79
- 5 Internal inequalities 98
-
Part II: Taxation and welfare
- 6 Taxation, welfare, and inequalities in the Spanish imperial state 121
- 7 Political economies of welfare of the Spanish Empire 138
- 8 Poverty, health, and imperial wealth in early modern Scotland 157
- 9 Compromise and adaptation in colonial taxation 177
- 10 Imperial revenue and national welfare 198
-
Part III: Post-colonial legacies
- 11 Making investor states 219
- 12 The lure of the welfare state following decolonisation in Kenya 240
- 13 From capitation taxes to tax havens 259
- 14 Imperial extraction and ‘tax havens’ 280
- 15 The Crown Agents and the CDC Group 299
- Afterword 319
- Index 329
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Front Matter i
- Contents v
- List of figures vii
- List of tables x
- Notes on contributors xi
- Preface xiv
- Acknowledgements xix
- Introduction 1
-
Part I: Institutional and fiscal issues
- 1 The great gage 19
- 2 The cost of thrift 37
- 3 Madagascar and French imperial mercantilism 57
- 4 The right to sovereign seizure? Taxation, valuation, and the Imperial British East Africa Company 79
- 5 Internal inequalities 98
-
Part II: Taxation and welfare
- 6 Taxation, welfare, and inequalities in the Spanish imperial state 121
- 7 Political economies of welfare of the Spanish Empire 138
- 8 Poverty, health, and imperial wealth in early modern Scotland 157
- 9 Compromise and adaptation in colonial taxation 177
- 10 Imperial revenue and national welfare 198
-
Part III: Post-colonial legacies
- 11 Making investor states 219
- 12 The lure of the welfare state following decolonisation in Kenya 240
- 13 From capitation taxes to tax havens 259
- 14 Imperial extraction and ‘tax havens’ 280
- 15 The Crown Agents and the CDC Group 299
- Afterword 319
- Index 329