3 The miracle of reunification
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John Lough
Abstract
Chapter 3 looks at the impact of Germany’s reunification on views of Russia. It explains how this miraculous outcome occurred more by chance than because of a conscious policy of benevolence on the part of Moscow towards Germans. Reunification is associated with a time when it seemed that a united Germany was fully reconciled with both its western and eastern neighbours and at peace with Russia. In historical terms, it was the shortest of unsustainable moments when the USSR was in retreat, close to unravelling and ready to make sacrifices in relations with the West to gain time. This was Russia’s second Brest-Litovsk of the twentieth century. Consequently, German gratitude to Moscow for reunification, while understandable, is exaggerated. Gorbachev’s decision to allow the USSR’s satellites to go their own way had made the process unstoppable. Germany’s good fortune lay in the fact that the speed of events outstripped Moscow’s ability to keep up and excluded the possibility to use force to save the country at least temporarily. In addition, Gorbachev accepted the western arguments that it made sense to integrate a united Germany into NATO. Even if Russia’s current leaders would not have followed the same logic and despise Gorbachev for allowing the USSR to disintegrate, they are still happy for Germany to feel a sense of obligation towards Moscow for making reunification possible. The emotions associated with the issue form another part of Germans’ historical conditioning and provide a pressure point for Russia in its dealings with Germany.
Abstract
Chapter 3 looks at the impact of Germany’s reunification on views of Russia. It explains how this miraculous outcome occurred more by chance than because of a conscious policy of benevolence on the part of Moscow towards Germans. Reunification is associated with a time when it seemed that a united Germany was fully reconciled with both its western and eastern neighbours and at peace with Russia. In historical terms, it was the shortest of unsustainable moments when the USSR was in retreat, close to unravelling and ready to make sacrifices in relations with the West to gain time. This was Russia’s second Brest-Litovsk of the twentieth century. Consequently, German gratitude to Moscow for reunification, while understandable, is exaggerated. Gorbachev’s decision to allow the USSR’s satellites to go their own way had made the process unstoppable. Germany’s good fortune lay in the fact that the speed of events outstripped Moscow’s ability to keep up and excluded the possibility to use force to save the country at least temporarily. In addition, Gorbachev accepted the western arguments that it made sense to integrate a united Germany into NATO. Even if Russia’s current leaders would not have followed the same logic and despise Gorbachev for allowing the USSR to disintegrate, they are still happy for Germany to feel a sense of obligation towards Moscow for making reunification possible. The emotions associated with the issue form another part of Germans’ historical conditioning and provide a pressure point for Russia in its dealings with Germany.
Chapters in this book
- Front matter i
- Contents v
- Acknowledgements vi
- Introduction 1
- 1 The weight of history 15
- 2 The development of German attitudes towards Russia 64
- 3 The miracle of reunification 89
- 4 A failure to read Russia correctly 109
- 5 2014: abandonment of illusions 155
- 6 An unfulfilled economic relationship 193
- 7 Russian influence in Germany 213
- 8 The outlook 234
- Conclusion 245
- Notes 257
- Index 288
Chapters in this book
- Front matter i
- Contents v
- Acknowledgements vi
- Introduction 1
- 1 The weight of history 15
- 2 The development of German attitudes towards Russia 64
- 3 The miracle of reunification 89
- 4 A failure to read Russia correctly 109
- 5 2014: abandonment of illusions 155
- 6 An unfulfilled economic relationship 193
- 7 Russian influence in Germany 213
- 8 The outlook 234
- Conclusion 245
- Notes 257
- Index 288
