Chapters in this book

1. Front matter i
2. Contents v
3. Preface vii
4. The main Greek political parties ix
5. List of abbreviations x
6. Part I How we arrived at the first Memorandum
7. 1 Was Greece ready for the euro? 3
8. 2 New Democracy’s criminal indifference 15
9. 3 PASOK’s opportunistic optimism 22
10. 4 Being in denial 24
11. 5 Ineffective solutions 34
12. 6 The bitter truth 46
13. 7 The first Memorandum 53
14. Part II The Memorandum’s first year of implementation
15. 8 The crisis spreads to the Union 69
16. 9 Implementing the Memorandum 82
17. 10 An ‘all-encompassing plan’ to solve the crisis in the Eurozone? 90
18. 11 An ‘all-encompassing plan’ to solve the crisis in Greece? 92
19. 12 A year of the Memorandum 100
20. A year of the Memorandum: seeking a new solution
21. 13 Debt restructuring 113
22. 14 A dead end 129
23. 15 More hitches 137
24. 16 The new solution 143
25. 17 Political games with unpredictable consequences 150
26. Part IV Coalition government, private sector involvement and the second Memorandum
27. 18 A flicker of hope 161
28. 19 Conflicts at the highest European level 165
29. 20 The new agreement with the Eurozone (the second Memorandum) and private sector involvement 172
30. 21 An evaluation of the Memoranda 189
31. 22 Austerity and growth 209
32. 23 The crisis peaks 225
33. Part V Elections of 6 May and 17 June 2012
34. 24 The election of 6 May 235
35. 25 Cracks in the euro 248
36. 26 The Union at a dead end 252
37. 27 The election of 17 June 264
38. 28 Provisional solutions, October–June 2013 274
39. 29 Evaluations of the assistance programme to Greece 291
40. 30 Cyprus 297
41. Part VI The future of Greece and the European Union
42. 31 The causes of the crisis were not only economic 303
43. 32 A new European policy is necessary 320
44. Appendix 343
45. Trajectory of the Greek financial crisis 348
46. Index 350