Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning

"The problem of philosophical scepticism is not so much what to say about the view itself (there being a consensus that it should be rejected), but rather what to say about the arguments that purport to yield it. And since these arguments involve...

John Koethe is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He was a Fellow at the American Academy in Berlin for Spring 2005. His many books include The Continuity of Wittgenstein's Thought, also from Cornell, Poetry at One Remove: Essays, North Point North: New and Selected Poems, Falling Water, and the forthcoming Sally's Hair.

This elegant book develops a novel response to a kind of skeptical argument that has received considerable attention over the past thirty years or so. Koethe critically considers the principal responses to the argument, and in the course of developing his proposal, puts forward intriguing (and sometimes radical) ideas on a broad range of topics, including logical validity, epistemological realism, and the concept of knowledge. The book is highly stimulating and rewarding, and it is also a pleasure to read. All philosophers interested in epistemology—novices and experts alike—will benefit from reading this book.

Robert Kraut, The Ohio State University:

This is one of the most intriguing discussions of epistemological scepticism I've seen in some time. John Koethe rigorously diagnoses the forces at work in sceptical arguments, foregrounding deep connections between epistemological scepticism and issues involving moral luck, free will, and Davidsonian theories of interpretation. He shows, moreover, that sceptical arguments manifest profound aspects of reasoning, validity, and the principles implicit in epistemic appraisal. Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning is a fine piece of systematic philosophy; it will provoke considerable discussion and will appeal to epistemologists, philosophers of language, and philosophers of logic.

Gilbert Harman, Princeton University:

In Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning, John Koethe usefully discusses various philosophical responses to the generally accepted knowledge transmission principle. He argues plausibly that our concept of knowledge is socially determined in a way that provides no adequate resolution. His argument involves a social account of what it is for something to be known and what it is to be epistemically possible, as well as a Dummett-style nonrealist semantics for these concepts. I like this book very much. It provides a novel approach to issues of contemporary interest, is very enjoyable to read, and provides an excellent account of recent literature in philosophical epistemology.