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4. Support for the Euromarket in the 1960s
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Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents v
- Preface vii
- Abbreviations ix
- 1. Introduction 1
-
PART I. THE RESTRICTIVE BRETTON WOODS FINANCIAL ORDER
- 2. Bretton Woods and the Endorsement of Capital Controls 25
- 3. Continuing Caution: The Slow and Limited Move to Convertibility 51
-
PART II. THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL F INANCE
- 4. Support for the Euromarket in the 1960s 81
- 5. Failed Cooperation in the Early 1970S 101
- 6. Four Turning Points in the Late 1970S and Early 1980s 123
- 7. The Liberalization Trend in the 1980s 146
- 8. Weathering International Financial Crises 169
-
PART III. CONCLUSION
- 9. Explaining Differing State Behavior in Trade and Finance 195
- Works Cited 211
- Index 237
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents v
- Preface vii
- Abbreviations ix
- 1. Introduction 1
-
PART I. THE RESTRICTIVE BRETTON WOODS FINANCIAL ORDER
- 2. Bretton Woods and the Endorsement of Capital Controls 25
- 3. Continuing Caution: The Slow and Limited Move to Convertibility 51
-
PART II. THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL F INANCE
- 4. Support for the Euromarket in the 1960s 81
- 5. Failed Cooperation in the Early 1970S 101
- 6. Four Turning Points in the Late 1970S and Early 1980s 123
- 7. The Liberalization Trend in the 1980s 146
- 8. Weathering International Financial Crises 169
-
PART III. CONCLUSION
- 9. Explaining Differing State Behavior in Trade and Finance 195
- Works Cited 211
- Index 237