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Chapter
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Contents
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents vii
- List of Maps and Figures ix
- List of Tables x
- Preface xi
- Note on Transliteration xiii
- 1. Organizing to Win 1
-
Part One: An Organizational Theory of Group Conflict
- 2. Organization and the Outcome of Conflicts 23
- 3. Advantages and Limitations of Structures 46
- 4. The Gist of the Organizational Theory 87
-
Part Two: Explaining the Outcomes of Afghan Conflicts
- 5. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan 101
- 6. Resilience through Division, 1979–1989 119
- 7. The Cost of the Failure to Restructure, 1989–1994 173
- 8. The Rise of the Taliban, 1994–2001 222
- 9. Afghan Conflicts under U.S. Occupation, 2001– 254
-
Part Three: And Beyond . . .
- 10. The Organizational Theory beyond Afghanistan 281
- Glossary of Terms 305
- Participants in Post-1978 Afghan Conflicts 309
- References 317
- Index 330
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents vii
- List of Maps and Figures ix
- List of Tables x
- Preface xi
- Note on Transliteration xiii
- 1. Organizing to Win 1
-
Part One: An Organizational Theory of Group Conflict
- 2. Organization and the Outcome of Conflicts 23
- 3. Advantages and Limitations of Structures 46
- 4. The Gist of the Organizational Theory 87
-
Part Two: Explaining the Outcomes of Afghan Conflicts
- 5. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan 101
- 6. Resilience through Division, 1979–1989 119
- 7. The Cost of the Failure to Restructure, 1989–1994 173
- 8. The Rise of the Taliban, 1994–2001 222
- 9. Afghan Conflicts under U.S. Occupation, 2001– 254
-
Part Three: And Beyond . . .
- 10. The Organizational Theory beyond Afghanistan 281
- Glossary of Terms 305
- Participants in Post-1978 Afghan Conflicts 309
- References 317
- Index 330