Counterinsurgency in Crisis

The British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when they tried to suppress insurgent violence, and their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past wars failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these campaigns against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, the volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of the British military's institutional response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring prevalence of insurgent methods, Counterinsurgency in Crisis underscores the need for military organizations and governments alike to anticipate and prepare for the irregular wars of tomorrow.

By juxtaposing the deterioration of situations from the Iraq War against Britain’s celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment.

David H. Ucko is associate professor at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University, and an adjunct fellow at the Department of War Studies, King's College London. His research areas include civil war, counterinsurgency, and war-to-peace transitions. He is the author of The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars and coeditor of Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict.

Robert Egnell is visiting associate professor and Director of Teaching in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. His research focuses on the conduct and effectiveness of different forms of stability operations and statebuilding. He is the author of Complex Peace Operations and Civil-Military Relations: Winning the Peace and coeditor of New Agendas in Statebuilding: Hybridity, Contingency, and History.

Colin Gray is professor of international politics and strategic studies at the University of Reading, England, and an external researcher at the Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College.

A long overdue account of British counterinsurgency efforts during Iraq and Afghanistan… a highly insightful analysis… not only a valuable read for anyone interested in the application of counterinsurgency, but especially for anyone interested in military adaptation and organizational learning.

Theo Farrell, King's College London:
Critical yet balanced, this book provides the best overall assessment of the British campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan currently in print.