3. Private Creditor Power and the Politics of Sovereign Debt Governance

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Acknowledgments ix
4. Introduction xiii
5. Part I. General Issues of Sovereign Debt Restructuring
6. 1. Creating a Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring That Works 3
7. 2. Sovereign Debt of Developing Countries: Overview of Trends and Policy Perspectives 33
8. 3. Private Creditor Power and the Politics of Sovereign Debt Governance 56
9. Part II. Two Case Studies: Argentina and Greece
10. 4. From the Pari Passu Discussion to the “Illegality” of Making Payments: The Case of Argentina 77
11. 5. Greek Debt Denial: A Modest Debt Restructuring Proposal and Why It Was Ignored 84
12. Part III. Improvements to the Contractual Approach
13. 6. Count the Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses in Sovereign Bonds 109
14. 7. Contractual and Voluntary Approaches to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: There Is Still More to Do 144
15. 8. Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Coasean Perspective 163
16. 9. Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Understanding the Benefits and Addressing Concerns 175
17. Part IV. Proposals for a Multinational Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Principles, Elements, and Institutionalization
18. 10. A Brief History of Sovereign Debt Resolution and a Proposal for a Multilateral Instrument 189
19. 11. Toward a Multilateral Framework for Recovery from Sovereign Insolvency 206
20. 12. Making a Legal Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring Operational: The Case for a Sovereign Debt Workout Institution 223
21. 13. Perspectives on a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Framework: Less Is More 231
22. 14. Toward a Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring: What Can Public International Law Contribute? 241
23. 15. Debts, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law: Advocating a Fair and Efficient Sovereign Insolvency Model 253
24. Contributors 269
25. Index 273