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3. An Electoral-Confirmation Connection and the Historical Rarity of a Contested Justice
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Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents vii
- List of Figures and Tables ix
- Preface: Democracy in Court? Presidents and Justices xiii
- 1. The Supreme Court’s Democracy Gap and the Erosion of Legitimacy 1
-
Part I: Constructing a Historically Distinct Court: How the Conservative Quest for Judicial Success Isolated the Justices from Majoritarian Democracy
- 2. Numerical Minority Justices as a Conservative Majority 9
- 3. An Electoral-Confirmation Connection and the Historical Rarity of a Contested Justice 21
- 4. How a Resurgent Senate Tamed the Judicial Desires of Electorally Dominant Presidents 37
- 5. Polarized Politics and the Court’s Legitimacy Paradox 63
-
Part II: Searching for Wizards of the Law: How the Rise of the Supreme Elite Further Distanced the Court from the American People
- 6. How the Redefinition of Quality Created a Cookie-Cutter Court 99
- 7. Choosing Right: How Conservative Efforts to Eliminate Ideological Drift Stifled Republican Presidential Choice 127
- 8. Democratic Presidents and the Avoidance of Confirmation Conflict 150
- 9. How the Selection of Unknown Voices with Different Audiences Transformed the Court into a Judicial Aristocracy 162
-
Part III: Legitimacy on the Campaign Trail: Can Electoral Success by Judicially Focused Candidates Reduce the Court’s Democracy Gap?
- 10. The Court Issue and the Presidential Election of 2016 199
- 11. The “Kavanaugh Effect” and the 2018 Senate Elections 223
- 12. The Never-Ending Promise of a Conservative Court and the 2020 Presidential Election 235
-
Concluding Section: Confronting Detours and Dead Ends: Liberal Resistance and Frustration in the Age of Conservative Dominance on the Court
- 13. How a Numerical Minority Rules the Law and Prevents Progressive Political Change 265
- 14. Reducing the Democracy Gap at the Coalface of Constitutional Politics 285
- Notes 293
- References 339
- Index 351
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents vii
- List of Figures and Tables ix
- Preface: Democracy in Court? Presidents and Justices xiii
- 1. The Supreme Court’s Democracy Gap and the Erosion of Legitimacy 1
-
Part I: Constructing a Historically Distinct Court: How the Conservative Quest for Judicial Success Isolated the Justices from Majoritarian Democracy
- 2. Numerical Minority Justices as a Conservative Majority 9
- 3. An Electoral-Confirmation Connection and the Historical Rarity of a Contested Justice 21
- 4. How a Resurgent Senate Tamed the Judicial Desires of Electorally Dominant Presidents 37
- 5. Polarized Politics and the Court’s Legitimacy Paradox 63
-
Part II: Searching for Wizards of the Law: How the Rise of the Supreme Elite Further Distanced the Court from the American People
- 6. How the Redefinition of Quality Created a Cookie-Cutter Court 99
- 7. Choosing Right: How Conservative Efforts to Eliminate Ideological Drift Stifled Republican Presidential Choice 127
- 8. Democratic Presidents and the Avoidance of Confirmation Conflict 150
- 9. How the Selection of Unknown Voices with Different Audiences Transformed the Court into a Judicial Aristocracy 162
-
Part III: Legitimacy on the Campaign Trail: Can Electoral Success by Judicially Focused Candidates Reduce the Court’s Democracy Gap?
- 10. The Court Issue and the Presidential Election of 2016 199
- 11. The “Kavanaugh Effect” and the 2018 Senate Elections 223
- 12. The Never-Ending Promise of a Conservative Court and the 2020 Presidential Election 235
-
Concluding Section: Confronting Detours and Dead Ends: Liberal Resistance and Frustration in the Age of Conservative Dominance on the Court
- 13. How a Numerical Minority Rules the Law and Prevents Progressive Political Change 265
- 14. Reducing the Democracy Gap at the Coalface of Constitutional Politics 285
- Notes 293
- References 339
- Index 351