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5. Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline?
The Case of Argentina, 1992–99
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Charles W. Calomiris
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Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents vii
- Acknowledgments ix
- 1. Prudential Supervision 1
- 2. Banking Systems around the Globe 31
- 3. Supervising Large Complex Banking Organizations 97
- 4. Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies 107
- 5. Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? 147
- 6. Dimensions of Credit Risk and Their Relationship to Economic Capital Requirements 197
- 7. Obstacles to Optimal Policy 233
- 8. Synergies between Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy 273
- 9. Did U.S. Bank Supervisors Get Tougher during the Credit Crunch? Did They Get Easier during the Banking Boom? Did It Matter to Bank Lending? 301
- Contributors 357
- Author Index 359
- Subject Index 363
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents vii
- Acknowledgments ix
- 1. Prudential Supervision 1
- 2. Banking Systems around the Globe 31
- 3. Supervising Large Complex Banking Organizations 97
- 4. Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies 107
- 5. Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? 147
- 6. Dimensions of Credit Risk and Their Relationship to Economic Capital Requirements 197
- 7. Obstacles to Optimal Policy 233
- 8. Synergies between Bank Supervision and Monetary Policy 273
- 9. Did U.S. Bank Supervisors Get Tougher during the Credit Crunch? Did They Get Easier during the Banking Boom? Did It Matter to Bank Lending? 301
- Contributors 357
- Author Index 359
- Subject Index 363
