4 MORAL HAZARD AND INCENTIVE DESIGN

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Preface ix
4. INTRODUCTION 1
5. 1 THE BASIC NEGOTIATION MODEL AND BARGAINING POWER 7
6. 2 EX ANTE INFORMATION CHALLENGES 18
7. 3 BRIDGING VALUATION GAPS WITH EARNOUTS 41
8. 4 MORAL HAZARD AND INCENTIVE DESIGN 67
9. 5 ASSET SPECIFICITY AND LONG-TERM CONTRACTS 88
10. 6 QUANTITY AND PRICE ADJUSTMENT IN LONG-TERM CONTRACTS 98
11. 7 EXITING A LONG-TERM DEAL 113
12. 8 CODIFYING THE DEAL 133
13. Notes 143
14. Acknowledgments 153
15. Index 155