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13. Mismatch: Rent Control and Natural Gas Field Prices
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Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Preface vii
- Contents ix
- Introduction 1
-
I. A Theory of Regulation
- 1. Typical Justifications for Regulation 15
- 2. Cost-of-Service Ratemaking 36
- 3. Historically Based Price Regulation 60
- 4. Allocation under a Public Interest Standard 71
- 5. Standard Setting 96
- 6. Historically Based Allocation 120
- 7. Individualized Screening 131
- 8. Alternatives to Classical Regulation 156
- 9. General Guidelines for Policy Makers 184
-
II. Appropriate Solutions
- 10. Match and Mismatch 191
- 11. Mismatch: Excessive Competition and Airline Regulation 197
- 12. Mismatch: Excessive Competition and the Trucking Industry 222
- 13. Mismatch: Rent Control and Natural Gas Field Prices 240
- 14. Partial Mismatch: Spillovers and Environmental Pollution 261
- 15. Problems of a Possible Match: Natural Monopoly and Telecommunications 285
-
III. Practical Reform
- 16. From Candidate to Reform 317
- 17. Generic Approaches to Regulatory Reform 341
- Appendix 1. The Regulatory Agencies 371
- Appendix 2. A Note on Administrative Law 378
- Further Reading 382
- Notes 386
- Index 462
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Preface vii
- Contents ix
- Introduction 1
-
I. A Theory of Regulation
- 1. Typical Justifications for Regulation 15
- 2. Cost-of-Service Ratemaking 36
- 3. Historically Based Price Regulation 60
- 4. Allocation under a Public Interest Standard 71
- 5. Standard Setting 96
- 6. Historically Based Allocation 120
- 7. Individualized Screening 131
- 8. Alternatives to Classical Regulation 156
- 9. General Guidelines for Policy Makers 184
-
II. Appropriate Solutions
- 10. Match and Mismatch 191
- 11. Mismatch: Excessive Competition and Airline Regulation 197
- 12. Mismatch: Excessive Competition and the Trucking Industry 222
- 13. Mismatch: Rent Control and Natural Gas Field Prices 240
- 14. Partial Mismatch: Spillovers and Environmental Pollution 261
- 15. Problems of a Possible Match: Natural Monopoly and Telecommunications 285
-
III. Practical Reform
- 16. From Candidate to Reform 317
- 17. Generic Approaches to Regulatory Reform 341
- Appendix 1. The Regulatory Agencies 371
- Appendix 2. A Note on Administrative Law 378
- Further Reading 382
- Notes 386
- Index 462