Non-destructive measuring techniques for on-site detection and identification of illicit nuclear material
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W. Rosenstock
Abstract
In case of a terrorist's threat to release nuclear or radioactive material methods and procedures are needed for fast search and, after detection, identification of the substance. For searching the German Fraunhofer-INT in Euskirchen has a car at its disposal, which is equipped with very sensitive detectors suitable for a first identification of the material. Advanced measurements are performed with portable detectors of high energy resolution or by scanning of buildings or objects with a gamma camera. Initially such material may be stored under water in preparation for an attack. In this case we have a special sensor available for detection and subsequent identification. In case of no suspicious material being detected with all these passive methods, even though a well-founded suspicion exists, active methods will be employed. Therefore neutron interrogation is briefly presented. With all these techniques it is possible to determine the presence of radioactive or fissionable materials, as well as, within certain limits, type and quantity of material. Hence information will be gained on the possible risk potential and, by actions taking radiological aspects into account, recommendations can be given on further actions to be taken.
Kurzfassung
Im Fall einer terroristischen Drohung nukleare oder radioaktive Stoffe freizusetzen, sind Methoden zur schnellen Suche und anschließend zur weitestgehenden Identifizierung des Materials gefragt. Für die Suche steht ein Fahrzeug, ausgerüstet mit hochempfindlichen Detektoren bereit, mit dem auch eine erste Identifizierung möglich ist. Die weitere Eingrenzung erfolgt mit tragbaren, hochauflösenden Detektoren oder durch abscannen von Gebäuden bzw. Objekten mit einer Gamma-Kamera. Werden derartige Stoffe zur Vorbereitung eines Anschlags zunächst unter Wasser gelagert, so steht eine spezielle Sonde zur Detektion und anschließender Identifizierung zur Verfügung. Wird bei einem gut begründeten Verdacht mit diesen passiven Methoden kein verdächtiges Material entdeckt so kommen aktive Verfahren zum Einsatz. Dazu wird hier kurz die Neutroneninterrogation vorgestellt. Mit all diesen Verfahren lässt sich feststellen, ob radioaktives oder spaltbares Material vorliegt, sowie innerhalb gewisser Grenzen auch Art und Menge. Daraus gewinnt man dann Aussagen über das mögliche Gefährdungspotential und kann Empfehlungen für das weitere Vorgehen unter Berücksichtigung radiologischer Gesichtspunkte geben.
References
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© 2009, Carl Hanser Verlag, München
Articles in the same Issue
- Contents/Inhalt
- Contents
- Summaries/Kurzfassungen
- Summaries
- Technical Contributions/Fachbeiträge
- Precautionary measures in case of radiological events
- Hazard and precautionary measures in connection with negligent or wilful contamination
- The Swiss disaster management plan for coping with the aftermath of radiological dispersal devices – “dirty bomb” operational concept
- Non-destructive measuring techniques for on-site detection and identification of illicit nuclear material
- Practicle example of the defence of a contamination incident
- Atmospheric dispersion modelling applying advanced model approaches
- Background information about polonium-210 – considerations on its biokinetics and internal dosimetry
- The Hamburg polonium-210 case: Monitoring of internal contaminations in a malevolent act
- Early warning against airborne radioactivity in Bavaria: Measuring network for radioactive immissions
- Automatic calculation of sites for positioning of mobile gamma probes in case of an emergency at a Bavarian nuclear power plant
- Nuclear emergency preparedness and response in Germany
- Determination and evaluation of the radiological situation using mobile measurements during the ground phase
- Erfahrungen aus der Übung „MERLIN“ zur Detektion radioaktiver Stoffe unter Beteiligung verschiedenen Einsatzfahrzeuge
Articles in the same Issue
- Contents/Inhalt
- Contents
- Summaries/Kurzfassungen
- Summaries
- Technical Contributions/Fachbeiträge
- Precautionary measures in case of radiological events
- Hazard and precautionary measures in connection with negligent or wilful contamination
- The Swiss disaster management plan for coping with the aftermath of radiological dispersal devices – “dirty bomb” operational concept
- Non-destructive measuring techniques for on-site detection and identification of illicit nuclear material
- Practicle example of the defence of a contamination incident
- Atmospheric dispersion modelling applying advanced model approaches
- Background information about polonium-210 – considerations on its biokinetics and internal dosimetry
- The Hamburg polonium-210 case: Monitoring of internal contaminations in a malevolent act
- Early warning against airborne radioactivity in Bavaria: Measuring network for radioactive immissions
- Automatic calculation of sites for positioning of mobile gamma probes in case of an emergency at a Bavarian nuclear power plant
- Nuclear emergency preparedness and response in Germany
- Determination and evaluation of the radiological situation using mobile measurements during the ground phase
- Erfahrungen aus der Übung „MERLIN“ zur Detektion radioaktiver Stoffe unter Beteiligung verschiedenen Einsatzfahrzeuge
