CONTENTS

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. CONTENTS v
3. Preface ix
4. 1. Introduction: Power, Welfare, Incentives, Values 1
5. PART I. WELFARE: The Problem, and a Possible Solution
6. 2. The Evolution of the Administrative State 27
7. 3. The Purposes and Functional Modes of the Administrative State: Market Failure and Government Failure 48
8. 4. The Structure of the Administrative State: A Hierarchy from Simple Agents to Trustees (and Guardians) 72
9. 5. Principles for Whether to Delegate to Independent Agencies: Credible Commitment to Settled Goals 92
10. 6. Design Precepts for How to Delegate to Independent Agencies 109
11. 7. Applying the Principles for Delegation 127
12. PART II. VALUES: Democratic Legitimacy for Independent Agencies
13. 8. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (1): Rule of Law and Constitutionalism 173
14. 9. Independent Agencies and Our Political Values and Beliefs (2): The Challenges to Delegation-with-Insulation Presented by Democracy 195
15. 10. Credible Commitment versus Democracy Agencies versus Judges 221
16. 11. The Political-Values-and-Norms Robustness Test of the Principles for Delegation 236
17. 12. Insulated Agencies and Constitutionalism: Central Bank Independence Driven by the Separation of Powers but Not a Fourth Branch 272
18. PART III. INCENTIVES: The Administrative State in the Real World; Incentives and Values under Different Constitutional Structures
19. 13. States’ Capacity for Principled Delegation to Deliver Credible Commitment 307
20. 14. The Problem of Vague Objectives: A Nondelegation Doctrine for IAs 334
21. 15. Processes, Transparency, and Accountability: Legal Constraints versus Political Oversight 349
22. 16. The Limits of Design: Power, Emergencies, and Self- Restraint 378
23. PART IV. POWER: Overmighty Citizens? The Political Economy of Central Banking; Power, Legitimacy, and Reconstruction
24. 17. Central Banking and The Politics of Monetary Policy 405
25. 18. The Shift in Ideas: Credibility as a Surprising Door to Legitimacy 414
26. 19. Tempting the Gods: Monetary Regime Orthodoxy before the Crisis 426
27. 20. A Money-Credit Constitution: Central Banks and Banking Stability 438
28. 21. Central Banking and the Regulatory State: Stability Policy 461
29. 22. Central Banking and the Fiscal State: Balance-Sheet Policy and the Fiscal Carve-Out 482
30. 23. Central Banks and the Emergency State: Lessons from Military/Civilian Relations for the Lender of Last Resort 503
31. 24. Overmighty Citizens After All? Threats and Reconfigurations 525
32. Conclusion: Unelected Democrats: Citizens in Service, Not in Charge 546
33. Appendix: The Principles for Delegation to Independent Agencies Insulated from Day-to-Day Politics 569
34. Acknowledgments 573
35. Bibliography 579
36. Index 611