A Rational Calculus of Voting Considering Coalition Signals: The 2005 German Bundestag Election as an Example
-
Eric Linhart
This article extends the calculus of rational voting (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968) by considering the coalition building process and the legislative process (cf. Austen-Smith & Banks, 1988) in multi-party systems. Comparing preferences on coalitions and their resulting legislative outcomes instead of party preferences, I create preference profiles of voters on coalitions and estimate the probability that a coalition forms, given the parties' coalition signals, and an expected electoral result. I illustrate the results of this rational calculus for the German Bundestag elections 2005 as a political map. Furthermore, this calculus allows the identification of coalition signals which raise and reduce a party's vote share.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- A Rational Calculus of Voting Considering Coalition Signals: The 2005 German Bundestag Election as an Example
- The Justification of Political Obligation
- Sources of Euroscepticism: Utilitarian Interest, Social Distrust, National Identity and Institutional Distrust
- Legislative Conduct in Response to Executive Initiative: Unity among Political Blocs in Chile
- Opposition in Non-Democratic Regimes: Notes on Possibilities and Limits of Current Theory
- Organizational Change in Local Governments: The Impact of the Danish Local Government Reform
- Energy Policy: Concepts, Actors, Instruments and Recent Developments
- How to Coerce a Multi-Dimensional System into a Undimensional Frame: Israel's 1996 Electoral Change
- The Dialectics of Multicultural Identity: Learning from Canada
- Regional Newspaper Coverage of Norwegian Local Elections: Election Coverage in the Agderposten and Fedrelandsvennen Newspapers
- On the Issue of Relations between the E.U. and Eastern European Countries
- Yoshida Shigeru's "Counter Infiltration" Plan against China: The Plan for Japanese Intelligence Activities in Mainland China 1952-1954
- The Contemporary American Vice Presidency: A School for the Presidency?
- The Invisible Violence of Celebrity Humanitarianism: Soft Images and Hard Words in the Making and Unmaking of Africa
- How Could Reconstruction of 'Linguistic Contexts' of Political Debates Advance Our Understanding of the Democratic Transition in Hungary, 1989-90?
- Globalization and Government Short-Term Room to Maneuver in Economic Policy: An Empirical Analysis of Reactions to Currency Crises
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- A Rational Calculus of Voting Considering Coalition Signals: The 2005 German Bundestag Election as an Example
- The Justification of Political Obligation
- Sources of Euroscepticism: Utilitarian Interest, Social Distrust, National Identity and Institutional Distrust
- Legislative Conduct in Response to Executive Initiative: Unity among Political Blocs in Chile
- Opposition in Non-Democratic Regimes: Notes on Possibilities and Limits of Current Theory
- Organizational Change in Local Governments: The Impact of the Danish Local Government Reform
- Energy Policy: Concepts, Actors, Instruments and Recent Developments
- How to Coerce a Multi-Dimensional System into a Undimensional Frame: Israel's 1996 Electoral Change
- The Dialectics of Multicultural Identity: Learning from Canada
- Regional Newspaper Coverage of Norwegian Local Elections: Election Coverage in the Agderposten and Fedrelandsvennen Newspapers
- On the Issue of Relations between the E.U. and Eastern European Countries
- Yoshida Shigeru's "Counter Infiltration" Plan against China: The Plan for Japanese Intelligence Activities in Mainland China 1952-1954
- The Contemporary American Vice Presidency: A School for the Presidency?
- The Invisible Violence of Celebrity Humanitarianism: Soft Images and Hard Words in the Making and Unmaking of Africa
- How Could Reconstruction of 'Linguistic Contexts' of Political Debates Advance Our Understanding of the Democratic Transition in Hungary, 1989-90?
- Globalization and Government Short-Term Room to Maneuver in Economic Policy: An Empirical Analysis of Reactions to Currency Crises