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The Fragmentation of Reputation

  • Gautam Bose
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 12. April 2010
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Aus der Zeitschrift The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Band 10 Heft 1

This paper investigates the use of reputation in an economy where principals hire agents for two different kinds of tasks, in which the agents have differing aptitudes. Principal-agent matches are remade every period, but a principal can acquire some information on the past behavior of her current agent. I consider two different reputation mechanisms—one in which an agent's past record of defections makes no reference to the kind of task (Integrated Reputation), and another in which information about past defections is available separately for each task (Fragmented Reputation). The two kinds of reputation can be interpreted as "personal honor" and performance record (e.g. credit history) respectively.I first characterize the equilibria under the two mechanisms and make some welfare comparisons, showing that IR strictly welfare dominates FR over a significant range of parameter values. I then show that, when both mechanisms are available, integrated reputation will not be used in equilibrium by principals. Thus if the economy is in equilibrium using only the IR mechanism, and the FR mechanism becomes subsequently available, then IR will become obsolete. In the appropriate ranges of parameter values, this change reduces welfare.

Keywords: reputation mechanisms; multitasking; institutional change
Published Online: 2010-4-12

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Topics Article
  2. Endogenous Investment and Pricing under Uncertainty
  3. Information Revelation in Markets with Pairwise Meetings: Complete Revelation in Dynamic Analysis
  4. Optimal Screening by Risk-Averse Principals
  5. Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns
  6. The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests
  7. The Fragmentation of Reputation
  8. Sharing Risk Efficiently under Suboptimal Punishments for Defection
  9. Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication
  10. Contractual Incompleteness for External Risks
  11. On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior
  12. Optimal Quality Scores in Sponsored Search Auctions: Full Extraction of Advertisers' Surplus
  13. A Theory of Credibility under Commitment
  14. Communication Breakdown: Consultation or Delegation from an Expert with Uncertain Bias
  15. Social Learning in Social Networks
  16. A Note on the Multidimensional Monopolist Problem and Intertemporal Price Discrimination
  17. A Note on Rationalizability and Restrictions on Beliefs
  18. Vote or Shout
  19. Asymmetry and Collusion in Sequential Procurement: A "Large Lot Last" Policy
  20. Status, Inequality and Intertemporal Choice
  21. Designing the Efficient Information-Processing Organization
  22. Ensuring Quality Provision through Capacity Regulation under Price Competition
  23. Successive Oligopolies and Decreasing Returns
  24. Advice by an Informed Intermediary: Can You Trust Your Broker?
  25. Advances Article
  26. Non-Bayesian Learning
  27. Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets
  28. Crime Reporting: Profiling and Neighbourhood Observation
  29. Endogenous Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions
  30. Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
  31. Walrasian Equilibrium and Reputation under Imperfect Public Monitoring
  32. Price Regulation under Demand Uncertainty
  33. Linear Demand Systems are Inconsistent with Discrete Choice
  34. Contributions Article
  35. Relative Extinction of Heterogeneous Agents
  36. Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments
  37. Kinked-Demand Equilibria and Weak Duopoly in the Hotelling Model of Horizontal Differentiation
  38. The Role of Replication-Invariance: Two Answers Concerning the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked
  39. Collusive Behavior of Bidders in English Auctions: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis
  40. Bad Government Can Be Good Politics: Political Reputation, Negative Campaigning, and Strategic Shirking
  41. Equilibrium Social Hierarchies: A Non-Cooperative Ordinal Status Game
  42. Bertrand Competition in Markets with Fixed Costs
  43. Regular Infinite Economies
  44. Existence of Competitive Equilibrium in Unbounded Exchange Economies with Satiation: A Note
  45. Quantifying the Cost of Risk in Consumption
  46. On a Class of Contest Success Functions
  47. Revealed Preference with Stochastic Demand Correspondence
  48. Contracting for Dynamic Efficiency
  49. Existence Advertising, Price Competition and Asymmetric Market Structure
  50. Global Social Interactions with Sequential Binary Decisions: The Case of Marriage, Divorce, and Stigma
  51. First-Mover Advantage in a Dynamic Duopoly with Spillover
  52. Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games
  53. Policy and Perspective
  54. Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition
  55. Understanding UPP
  56. Upward Pricing Pressure in Horizontal Merger Analysis: Reply to Epstein and Rubinfeld
https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1642
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
reputation mechanisms; multitasking; institutional change

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Topics Article
  2. Endogenous Investment and Pricing under Uncertainty
  3. Information Revelation in Markets with Pairwise Meetings: Complete Revelation in Dynamic Analysis
  4. Optimal Screening by Risk-Averse Principals
  5. Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns
  6. The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests
  7. The Fragmentation of Reputation
  8. Sharing Risk Efficiently under Suboptimal Punishments for Defection
  9. Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication
  10. Contractual Incompleteness for External Risks
  11. On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior
  12. Optimal Quality Scores in Sponsored Search Auctions: Full Extraction of Advertisers' Surplus
  13. A Theory of Credibility under Commitment
  14. Communication Breakdown: Consultation or Delegation from an Expert with Uncertain Bias
  15. Social Learning in Social Networks
  16. A Note on the Multidimensional Monopolist Problem and Intertemporal Price Discrimination
  17. A Note on Rationalizability and Restrictions on Beliefs
  18. Vote or Shout
  19. Asymmetry and Collusion in Sequential Procurement: A "Large Lot Last" Policy
  20. Status, Inequality and Intertemporal Choice
  21. Designing the Efficient Information-Processing Organization
  22. Ensuring Quality Provision through Capacity Regulation under Price Competition
  23. Successive Oligopolies and Decreasing Returns
  24. Advice by an Informed Intermediary: Can You Trust Your Broker?
  25. Advances Article
  26. Non-Bayesian Learning
  27. Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets
  28. Crime Reporting: Profiling and Neighbourhood Observation
  29. Endogenous Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions
  30. Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
  31. Walrasian Equilibrium and Reputation under Imperfect Public Monitoring
  32. Price Regulation under Demand Uncertainty
  33. Linear Demand Systems are Inconsistent with Discrete Choice
  34. Contributions Article
  35. Relative Extinction of Heterogeneous Agents
  36. Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments
  37. Kinked-Demand Equilibria and Weak Duopoly in the Hotelling Model of Horizontal Differentiation
  38. The Role of Replication-Invariance: Two Answers Concerning the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked
  39. Collusive Behavior of Bidders in English Auctions: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis
  40. Bad Government Can Be Good Politics: Political Reputation, Negative Campaigning, and Strategic Shirking
  41. Equilibrium Social Hierarchies: A Non-Cooperative Ordinal Status Game
  42. Bertrand Competition in Markets with Fixed Costs
  43. Regular Infinite Economies
  44. Existence of Competitive Equilibrium in Unbounded Exchange Economies with Satiation: A Note
  45. Quantifying the Cost of Risk in Consumption
  46. On a Class of Contest Success Functions
  47. Revealed Preference with Stochastic Demand Correspondence
  48. Contracting for Dynamic Efficiency
  49. Existence Advertising, Price Competition and Asymmetric Market Structure
  50. Global Social Interactions with Sequential Binary Decisions: The Case of Marriage, Divorce, and Stigma
  51. First-Mover Advantage in a Dynamic Duopoly with Spillover
  52. Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games
  53. Policy and Perspective
  54. Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition
  55. Understanding UPP
  56. Upward Pricing Pressure in Horizontal Merger Analysis: Reply to Epstein and Rubinfeld
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