A Theory of Credibility under Commitment

Articles in the same Issue

1. Topics Article
2. Endogenous Investment and Pricing under Uncertainty
3. Information Revelation in Markets with Pairwise Meetings: Complete Revelation in Dynamic Analysis
4. Optimal Screening by Risk-Averse Principals
5. Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns
6. The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests
7. The Fragmentation of Reputation
8. Sharing Risk Efficiently under Suboptimal Punishments for Defection
9. Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication
10. Contractual Incompleteness for External Risks
11. On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior
12. Optimal Quality Scores in Sponsored Search Auctions: Full Extraction of Advertisers' Surplus
13. A Theory of Credibility under Commitment
14. Communication Breakdown: Consultation or Delegation from an Expert with Uncertain Bias
15. Social Learning in Social Networks
16. A Note on the Multidimensional Monopolist Problem and Intertemporal Price Discrimination
17. A Note on Rationalizability and Restrictions on Beliefs
18. Vote or Shout
19. Asymmetry and Collusion in Sequential Procurement: A "Large Lot Last" Policy
20. Status, Inequality and Intertemporal Choice
21. Designing the Efficient Information-Processing Organization
22. Ensuring Quality Provision through Capacity Regulation under Price Competition
23. Successive Oligopolies and Decreasing Returns
24. Advice by an Informed Intermediary: Can You Trust Your Broker?
25. Advances Article
26. Non-Bayesian Learning
27. Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets
28. Crime Reporting: Profiling and Neighbourhood Observation
29. Endogenous Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions
30. Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
31. Walrasian Equilibrium and Reputation under Imperfect Public Monitoring
32. Price Regulation under Demand Uncertainty
33. Linear Demand Systems are Inconsistent with Discrete Choice
34. Contributions Article
35. Relative Extinction of Heterogeneous Agents
36. Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments
37. Kinked-Demand Equilibria and Weak Duopoly in the Hotelling Model of Horizontal Differentiation
38. The Role of Replication-Invariance: Two Answers Concerning the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked
39. Collusive Behavior of Bidders in English Auctions: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis
40. Bad Government Can Be Good Politics: Political Reputation, Negative Campaigning, and Strategic Shirking
41. Equilibrium Social Hierarchies: A Non-Cooperative Ordinal Status Game
42. Bertrand Competition in Markets with Fixed Costs
43. Regular Infinite Economies
44. Existence of Competitive Equilibrium in Unbounded Exchange Economies with Satiation: A Note
45. Quantifying the Cost of Risk in Consumption
46. On a Class of Contest Success Functions
47. Revealed Preference with Stochastic Demand Correspondence
48. Contracting for Dynamic Efficiency
49. Existence Advertising, Price Competition and Asymmetric Market Structure
50. Global Social Interactions with Sequential Binary Decisions: The Case of Marriage, Divorce, and Stigma
51. First-Mover Advantage in a Dynamic Duopoly with Spillover
52. Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games
53. Policy and Perspective
54. Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition
55. Understanding UPP
56. Upward Pricing Pressure in Horizontal Merger Analysis: Reply to Epstein and Rubinfeld