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Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening

  • Daniel Krahmer and Roland Strausz
Published/Copyright: October 6, 2008
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
From the journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Volume 8 Issue 1

This paper investigates how additional ex post private information by the agent affects the equilibrium outcome of the monopolistic screening model. In general, the principal always weakly benefits when the agent receives additional private information after the contracting stage. Instead, both the agent's equilibrium payoffs and allocative efficiency may, due to the principal's concerns about information rents, increase or decrease. Moreover, we obtain the result that optimal contracts may involve lying off–the–equilibrium path and show that this exacerbates bunching in the monopolistic screening problem.

Keywords: monopolistic screening; sequential screening; adverse selection; ex post private information
Published Online: 2008-10-6

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Topics Article
  2. When Stackelberg and Cournot Equilibria Coincide
  3. Conflict and Consensus: A Theory of Control in Organisations
  4. Backward Integrated Information Gatekeepers and Independent Divisions in the Product Market
  5. Identification of Individual Demands from Market Data under Uncertainty
  6. On the Role of Uncertainty in the Risk-Incentives Tradeoff
  7. Time-to-Build and the Inverse U-Shape Investment-Uncertainty Relationship
  8. Revisiting Independence and Stochastic Dominance for Compound Lotteries
  9. On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
  10. A Duopoly Location Toolkit: Consumer Densities Which Yield Unique Spatial Duopoly Equilibria
  11. Purchasing Power Parity with Strategic Markets
  12. Global vs. Local Information in (Anti-)Coordination Problems with Imitators
  13. Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability
  14. Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and the R&D Subsidy Policy
  15. Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds
  16. Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening
  17. Passing the Buck in Sequential Negotiation
  18. Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
  19. The Dirty Face Problem with Unawareness
  20. Cost Pass-Through under Delegation
  21. Contributions Article
  22. Empirical Implications of Information Structure in Finite Extensive Form Games
  23. Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
  24. Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games
  25. A Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased Decision Making
  26. Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
  27. Connectivity and Allocation Rule in a Directed Network
  28. Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision
  29. Principal-Agent Problems with Exit Options
  30. Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial Markets
  31. A Constructive Proof that Learning in Repeated Games Leads to Nash Equilibria
  32. Advances Article
  33. The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1458
Keywords for this article
monopolistic screening; sequential screening; adverse selection; ex post private information

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Topics Article
  2. When Stackelberg and Cournot Equilibria Coincide
  3. Conflict and Consensus: A Theory of Control in Organisations
  4. Backward Integrated Information Gatekeepers and Independent Divisions in the Product Market
  5. Identification of Individual Demands from Market Data under Uncertainty
  6. On the Role of Uncertainty in the Risk-Incentives Tradeoff
  7. Time-to-Build and the Inverse U-Shape Investment-Uncertainty Relationship
  8. Revisiting Independence and Stochastic Dominance for Compound Lotteries
  9. On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
  10. A Duopoly Location Toolkit: Consumer Densities Which Yield Unique Spatial Duopoly Equilibria
  11. Purchasing Power Parity with Strategic Markets
  12. Global vs. Local Information in (Anti-)Coordination Problems with Imitators
  13. Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability
  14. Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and the R&D Subsidy Policy
  15. Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds
  16. Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening
  17. Passing the Buck in Sequential Negotiation
  18. Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
  19. The Dirty Face Problem with Unawareness
  20. Cost Pass-Through under Delegation
  21. Contributions Article
  22. Empirical Implications of Information Structure in Finite Extensive Form Games
  23. Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
  24. Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games
  25. A Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased Decision Making
  26. Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
  27. Connectivity and Allocation Rule in a Directed Network
  28. Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision
  29. Principal-Agent Problems with Exit Options
  30. Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial Markets
  31. A Constructive Proof that Learning in Repeated Games Leads to Nash Equilibria
  32. Advances Article
  33. The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
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