Backward Integrated Information Gatekeepers and Independent Divisions in the Product Market

Articles in the same Issue

1. Topics Article
2. When Stackelberg and Cournot Equilibria Coincide
3. Conflict and Consensus: A Theory of Control in Organisations
4. Backward Integrated Information Gatekeepers and Independent Divisions in the Product Market
5. Identification of Individual Demands from Market Data under Uncertainty
6. On the Role of Uncertainty in the Risk-Incentives Tradeoff
7. Time-to-Build and the Inverse U-Shape Investment-Uncertainty Relationship
8. Revisiting Independence and Stochastic Dominance for Compound Lotteries
9. On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
10. A Duopoly Location Toolkit: Consumer Densities Which Yield Unique Spatial Duopoly Equilibria
11. Purchasing Power Parity with Strategic Markets
12. Global vs. Local Information in (Anti-)Coordination Problems with Imitators
13. Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability
14. Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and the R&D Subsidy Policy
15. Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds
16. Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening
17. Passing the Buck in Sequential Negotiation
18. Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
19. The Dirty Face Problem with Unawareness
20. Cost Pass-Through under Delegation
21. Contributions Article
22. Empirical Implications of Information Structure in Finite Extensive Form Games
23. Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
24. Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games
25. A Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased Decision Making
26. Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost
27. Connectivity and Allocation Rule in a Directed Network
28. Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision
29. Principal-Agent Problems with Exit Options
30. Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial Markets
31. A Constructive Proof that Learning in Repeated Games Leads to Nash Equilibria
32. Advances Article
33. The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions