How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?
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Elizabeth Anderson
Individuals in capitalist societies are increasingly exposed to market risks. Luck egalitarian theories, which advocate neutralizing the influence of luck on distribution, fail to cope with this problem, because they focus on the wrong kinds of distributive constraints. Rules of distributive justice can specify (1) acceptable procedures for allocating goods, (2) the range of acceptable variations in distributive outcomes, or (3) which individuals should have which goods, according to individual characteristics such as desert or need. Desert-catering luck egalitarians offer rules of the third type. Their theories fail because considerations of market efficiency, freedom, and dignity undermine the claims of desert to inform standards of justice for society as a whole. Responsibility-catering luck egalitarians offer rules of the first type. Their theories fail because such rules don’t constrain the downside risks of market choices. To solve this problem, we need rules of the second type, which allow market forces, and hence luck, to influence distributive outcomes, but only within an acceptable egalitarian range. The ideal of equality in social relations helps us devise acceptable constraints at the top, bottom, and middle of the income range.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- Luck and Identity
- Luck Between Morality, Law, and Justice
- Closing the Gap
- Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and Moral Luck
- Wresting Control from Luck: The Secular Case for Aborted Attempts
- Liability Insurance, Moral Luck, and Auto Accidents
- Lucky in Your Judge
- Luck in the Courts
- How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?
- Luck Egalitarianism and Political Solidarity
- Decentralized Responses to Good Fortune and Bad Luck
- Forum
- Comment on Dan-Cohen's "Luck and Identity"
- Comment on David Enoch's Luck Between Morality, Law, and Justice
- Mind the Gap: A Reply to Ripstein
- Responsibility and Moral Luck: Comments on Benjamin Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and Moral Luck
- A Few Instrumental Thoughts About Luck, Accidents, and Insurance
- A Comment on Jeremy Waldron's "Lucky in Your Judge"
- Lack of Luck in the Courts: A Comment on Menachem Mautner
- Temptations of Pure Procedural Justice: A Comment on Elizabeth Anderson
- Is There a Difference Between Moral Luck and "Plain Luck that Has Moral Implications"?
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- Luck and Identity
- Luck Between Morality, Law, and Justice
- Closing the Gap
- Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and Moral Luck
- Wresting Control from Luck: The Secular Case for Aborted Attempts
- Liability Insurance, Moral Luck, and Auto Accidents
- Lucky in Your Judge
- Luck in the Courts
- How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?
- Luck Egalitarianism and Political Solidarity
- Decentralized Responses to Good Fortune and Bad Luck
- Forum
- Comment on Dan-Cohen's "Luck and Identity"
- Comment on David Enoch's Luck Between Morality, Law, and Justice
- Mind the Gap: A Reply to Ripstein
- Responsibility and Moral Luck: Comments on Benjamin Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and Moral Luck
- A Few Instrumental Thoughts About Luck, Accidents, and Insurance
- A Comment on Jeremy Waldron's "Lucky in Your Judge"
- Lack of Luck in the Courts: A Comment on Menachem Mautner
- Temptations of Pure Procedural Justice: A Comment on Elizabeth Anderson
- Is There a Difference Between Moral Luck and "Plain Luck that Has Moral Implications"?
