Damages for Breach of Duty in Corporate Disclosure
-
Urs Schweizer
Abstract
Information provided by an agent affects the prices at which equity transactions take place. The agent may breach his duty either by spending too little effort at investigating relevant matters or by unduly manipulating the obtained information. As a consequence of such breach of duty, market participants may suffer from losses. Legal systems provide a rather disparate array of remedies without providing a coherent theory that would support the design of these remedies. The present paper proposes a general principle according to which courts may award expectation damages and it identifies sufficient conditions under which such damages would generate incentives for the agent to investigate with due care and to duly disclose the information.
©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Article
- Introduction: CESifo Conference in Law and Economics - Munich, May 2010
- Damages for Breach of Duty in Corporate Disclosure
- 'Take It or Go to Court': The Impact of Sec. 1a of the German Protection Against Dismissal Act on Severance Payments
- Interjurisdictional Linkages and the Scope for Interventionist Legal Harmonization
- The Law and Economics Analysis of Intellectual Property: Paradigmatic Shift From Incentives to Traditional Property
- Class Actions, Compliance and Moral Cost
- The Law and Economics of Enhancing Cartel Enforcement: Using Information From Non-Cartel Investigations to Prosecute Cartels
- Media and Litigation
- Shooting Rampages and Maintenance of Campus Safety: An Incomplete Contracts Perspective
- Competition, Imitation, and R&D Productivity in a Growth Model with Industry-Specific Patent Protection
Articles in the same Issue
- Article
- Introduction: CESifo Conference in Law and Economics - Munich, May 2010
- Damages for Breach of Duty in Corporate Disclosure
- 'Take It or Go to Court': The Impact of Sec. 1a of the German Protection Against Dismissal Act on Severance Payments
- Interjurisdictional Linkages and the Scope for Interventionist Legal Harmonization
- The Law and Economics Analysis of Intellectual Property: Paradigmatic Shift From Incentives to Traditional Property
- Class Actions, Compliance and Moral Cost
- The Law and Economics of Enhancing Cartel Enforcement: Using Information From Non-Cartel Investigations to Prosecute Cartels
- Media and Litigation
- Shooting Rampages and Maintenance of Campus Safety: An Incomplete Contracts Perspective
- Competition, Imitation, and R&D Productivity in a Growth Model with Industry-Specific Patent Protection
