The Multiplier Effect of Public Expenditure on Justice: The Case of Rental Litigation
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Bruno Deffains
When courts are congested, the risk associated with facing a defaulting tenant is high for landlords. They tend to compensate for this risk by increasing rents to include a “risk premium.” This has the effect of making the probability of defaulting increase, as well as further overloading the courts. Using a simple model we show in this paper how a better equilibrium can be reached when the resources of the judiciary are slightly increased. Our explanation is that a rise in public legal resources not only allows courts to produce more decisions (direct effect), but also reduces the number of cases coming in by giving landlords an incentive to charge lower rents (indirect effect). The synergy of the two effects creates a multiplier of public expenditure on justice.
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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- In the Beginning Was the Word. Now is the Copyright
- The $700 Billion Bailout: A Public-Choice Interpretation
- Corporate Liability and Internal Procedures
- The Social Cost of Blackmail
- The Problem of Social Cost: What Problem? A Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. Pigou and R.H. Coase
- Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?
- Implementing Relevant Market Tests in Antitrust Policy: Application to Computer Servers
- English Rule and Frivolous Suits: Conditional versus Hourly Fees
- Compliance Institutions in Treaties
- A Note on the Deterrence Effects of the Forfeiture of Illegal Gains
- Fostering Regulatory Compliance: The Role of Environmental Self-Auditing and Audit Policies
- Free-Riding on Altruistic Punishment? An Experimental Comparison of Third-Party Punishment in a Stand-Alone and in an In-Group Environment
- Corporatization and Firm Performance: Evidence from Publicly-Provided Local Utilities
- Securities Class Actions: A Helping Hand for Bank Regulators in Trouble?
- The Multiplier Effect of Public Expenditure on Justice: The Case of Rental Litigation
