The $700 Billion Bailout: A Public-Choice Interpretation
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Carlos D. Ramirez
On September 29, 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to reject HR 3997 (known as the original $700 Billion Bailout Bill). On October 3, the House reversed course and voted to approve the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). This paper applies a political voting model to these two House votes – the rejection of the bill on September 29 and its passage on October 3. Both economic conditions and PAC contributions matter in explaining the two votes, but their effect is attenuated by the individual legislator’s power. PAC contributions from the American Bankers Association appear to matter for explaining those legislators who switched. The role of ideology in explaining either the September 29 or October 3 vote is limited.
©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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- In the Beginning Was the Word. Now is the Copyright
- The $700 Billion Bailout: A Public-Choice Interpretation
- Corporate Liability and Internal Procedures
- The Social Cost of Blackmail
- The Problem of Social Cost: What Problem? A Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. Pigou and R.H. Coase
- Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?
- Implementing Relevant Market Tests in Antitrust Policy: Application to Computer Servers
- English Rule and Frivolous Suits: Conditional versus Hourly Fees
- Compliance Institutions in Treaties
- A Note on the Deterrence Effects of the Forfeiture of Illegal Gains
- Fostering Regulatory Compliance: The Role of Environmental Self-Auditing and Audit Policies
- Free-Riding on Altruistic Punishment? An Experimental Comparison of Third-Party Punishment in a Stand-Alone and in an In-Group Environment
- Corporatization and Firm Performance: Evidence from Publicly-Provided Local Utilities
- Securities Class Actions: A Helping Hand for Bank Regulators in Trouble?
- The Multiplier Effect of Public Expenditure on Justice: The Case of Rental Litigation
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- In the Beginning Was the Word. Now is the Copyright
- The $700 Billion Bailout: A Public-Choice Interpretation
- Corporate Liability and Internal Procedures
- The Social Cost of Blackmail
- The Problem of Social Cost: What Problem? A Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. Pigou and R.H. Coase
- Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?
- Implementing Relevant Market Tests in Antitrust Policy: Application to Computer Servers
- English Rule and Frivolous Suits: Conditional versus Hourly Fees
- Compliance Institutions in Treaties
- A Note on the Deterrence Effects of the Forfeiture of Illegal Gains
- Fostering Regulatory Compliance: The Role of Environmental Self-Auditing and Audit Policies
- Free-Riding on Altruistic Punishment? An Experimental Comparison of Third-Party Punishment in a Stand-Alone and in an In-Group Environment
- Corporatization and Firm Performance: Evidence from Publicly-Provided Local Utilities
- Securities Class Actions: A Helping Hand for Bank Regulators in Trouble?
- The Multiplier Effect of Public Expenditure on Justice: The Case of Rental Litigation