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Copyright Infringement, Product Quality and Producer's Profit

  • Dyuti Banerjee und Vivekananda Mukherjee
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 31. Dezember 2007
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Abstract

This paper uses a strategic entry-deterrence framework to study the relationship between copying cost, and a monopolist’s profit and product quality. The potential entrant is a fake-producer producing and selling identical copies of the monopolist’s product. The monopolist’s subgame perfect equilibrium quality and profit is either unaffected or positively affected by changes in the copying cost. Tariffs on copying devices may be an effective copyright right protection instrument. Though an increase in tariff increases the product quality and monopolist’s profit, its welfare effects are ambiguous.

Published Online: 2007-12-31

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Heruntergeladen am 8.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.2202/1555-5879.1159/html?lang=de
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