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The Confused U.S. Framework for Foreign-Bank Insolvency: An Open Research Agenda
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
1. April 2005
Many of the world’s banks have operations, if not branches or agencies, in the United States. When these banks fail, their U.S. operations and assets are subject to a confused, and confusing, patchwork of insolvency laws, both federal and state. This essay examines that legal patchwork, asking whether it is desirable, much less efficient, for a nation to have an inconsistent foreign-bank insolvency regime. The essay does not attempt to provide final answers but, instead, focuses on identifying the threshold conceptual issues that must be resolved before attempting to provide answers.
Published Online: 2005-4-1
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- Brandeis and Holmes, Business and Economics, Then and Now
- Legal Durability
- Featuring the Three Tenors in La Triviata
- A Response to Professor Goldberg: An Anticompetitive Restraint by Any Other Name . . .
- A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders
- The Confused U.S. Framework for Foreign-Bank Insolvency: An Open Research Agenda
- Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition
- Completing Contracts Ex Post: How Car Manufacturers Manage Car Dealers
