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Aspects of Peace Economics

  • Raymond Dacey und Lisa J Carlson
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 6. Januar 2011
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
Aus der Zeitschrift Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Band 16 Heft 2

The Economics of Peace can be modeled as a basic multi-game system composed of economic games played between and among firms and consumers in each of two nations, domestic pressure games played by firms, consumers, and the government within each nation, and political games played between the governments of the two nations. The integrated study of the basic system is given in the account of two-level games (Putnam, 1988). The details of these games were sketched in Dacey (1994, 1996-a) and are updated here via the results obtained in the assassin models presented in Carlson and Dacey (2009, forthcoming). While the field has made numerous advances in the last sixteen years, the conclusion of Dacey (1994) still holds — Peace Economics, as initially characterized by Isard (1994) and Polachek (1994), consists in the resolution of conflicts arising in the multi-game system. Since the games are played rationally, the tools of Peace Economics are the tools of the general theory of rational choice.

Keywords: peace economics; rational choice; two-level games; assassin models
Published Online: 2011-1-6

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Research Paper
  2. On the Nature of Peace Economics
  3. Aspects of Peace Economics
  4. Current Research and Future Directions in Peace Economics: Trade Gone Awry
  5. On the Cost of Violence and the Benefit of Peace
  6. Peace Science and Peace Economics Can Help Win the Fight against Nuclear Proliferation
  7. On the Salience of Identity in Civilizational and Sectarian Conflict
  8. Land Inequality and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa
  9. On Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts: An Economist's View
  10. Endogenous Institution in Decentralization
  11. In Memoriam: Walter Isard
https://doi.org/10.2202/1554-8597.1210
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
peace economics; rational choice; two-level games; assassin models

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Research Paper
  2. On the Nature of Peace Economics
  3. Aspects of Peace Economics
  4. Current Research and Future Directions in Peace Economics: Trade Gone Awry
  5. On the Cost of Violence and the Benefit of Peace
  6. Peace Science and Peace Economics Can Help Win the Fight against Nuclear Proliferation
  7. On the Salience of Identity in Civilizational and Sectarian Conflict
  8. Land Inequality and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa
  9. On Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts: An Economist's View
  10. Endogenous Institution in Decentralization
  11. In Memoriam: Walter Isard
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