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Pollution Taxes for Monopolistically Competitive Firms
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Henrik Vetter
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
19. Mai 2005
This paper examines ways of taxing monopolistically competitive firms that pollute the environment. There are two sources of welfare loss: production externalities and product selection bias associated with fixed costs. We argue that the optimal firm specific tax is always, strictly speaking, less than the Pigouvian tax and that furthermore, under some circumstances, both Pigouvian and optimal taxes leave the monopolistically competitive industry with too few firms. Under either regime, however, the tax targets the right firms.
Keywords: externalities; monopolistic competition
Published Online: 2005-5-19
©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Advances Article
- Asymmetric Vertical Integration
- Shocks and Business Cycles
- Identification of Preferences from Market Data
- On the Right-of-First-Refusal
- Denial of Death and Economic Behavior
- Contributions Article
- Utility Equivalence in Auctions
- Pollution Taxes for Monopolistically Competitive Firms
- On the Welfare Evaluation of Income and Opportunity
- Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions
- Limited Attention as the Bound on Rationality
- Topics Article
- Upward and Downward Limit Pricing: The Role of Post-Entry Competition
- Anonymous Bidding and Revenue Maximization
- Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information
- Likely Events and Possible States
