5. Inside-Out Enforcement

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Acknowledgments ix
4. Introduction 1
5. 1. The Causes of Corporate Crime: An Economic Perspective 11
6. 2. Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the Law of Unconstitutional Conditions 38
7. 3. Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms 62
8. 4. Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability 87
9. 5. Inside-Out Enforcement 110
10. 6. The Institutional Logic of Preventive Crime 132
11. 7. Collaborative Organizational Prosecution 154
12. 8. The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency 177
13. 9. What Are the Rules If Everybody Wants to Play? Multiple Federal and State Prosecutors (Acting) as Regulators 202
14. 10. Reforming the Corporate Monitor? 226
15. Conclusion 249
16. Contributors 259
17. Index 263