9 CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: AN OXYMORON?

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. CONTENTS vii
3. PREFACE ix
4. CONTRIBUTORS xi
5. INTRODUCTION 1
6. PART I DELIBERATION, DECISION, AND ENFORCEMENT
7. 1 DISCLOSURE VERSUS ANONYMITY IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE 17
8. 2 PAYING FOR POLITICS 55
9. 3 INSTITUTING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 75
10. 4 DEMOCRACY, ELECTORAL AND CONTESTATORY 105
11. PART II DEMOCRACY BEYOND THE NATION-STATE
12. 5 SELF-DETERMINATION AND GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: A CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL NATIONALISM 145
13. 6 FALLACIES OF NATIONALISM 184
14. 7 BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND LAW: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE DESIGN OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 209
15. 8 DESIGNING A DEMOCRACY FOR THE EURO-POLITY AND REVISING DEMOCRATIC THEORY IN THE PROCESS 224
16. PART III LIMITS TO INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN?
17. 9 CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: AN OXYMORON? 251
18. 10 DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC? 285
19. 11 POWER-SHARING VERSUS BORDER-CROSSING IN ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 296
20. 12 PROVISIONAL PESSIMISM: A REPLY TO VAN PARIJS 321
21. INDEX 329