“Minimum Advertised Price” policies and the dividing line between price and non-price restraints – An analysis under U.S. antitrust and EU competition law in view of recent UK decisions
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Denis Schlimpert
Abstract
“Minimum Advertised Price” (MAP) policies prohibit retailers from advertising prices below a certain amount fixed by their suppliers. Legally, they leave the final decision on resale pricing to the retailers. However, given that, especially in the context of online sales, the communication of discounts through advertising is one of the retailers’ “key incentives” for price competition, MAP policies raise specific issues as to where the dividing line between (unlawful) price and (lawful) non-price restraints in vertical agreements is drawn. In this respect, the following contribution analyses MAP policies both under U.S. antitrust and EU competition law. With regard to the latter, it will particularly focus on two recent UK decisions.
Abstract
“Minimum Advertised Price” policies and the dividing line between price and non-price restraints – An analysis under U.S. antitrust and EU competition law in view of recent UK decisions
“Minimum Advertised Price” (MAP) policies prohibit retailers from advertising prices below a certain amount fixed by their suppliers. Although, legally, they leave the final decision on resale pricing to the retailers, they remove one of the retailers’ “key incentives” for price competition, i.e. the communication of discounts through advertising which is particularly important in the context of online sales. The author analyses U.S. and EU and in particular two recent UK decisions with regard to the application of RPM analysis on MAP policies. The article shows that U.S. antitrust law sets the dividing line between (unlawful) price and (lawful) non-price restraints in vertical agreements differently than EU competition law does.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Cover
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Veranstaltungshinweise
- Aufsätze
- Die Vergabe von Rettungsdienstleistungsaufträgen und -konzessionen nach neuem Vergaberecht
- The Role of Non-Coordinated Effects in the Assessment of Minority Shareholdings
- The EU Commission’s settlement practice
- Harmonisierung des Kartellbußgeldrechts qua effet utile?
- “Minimum Advertised Price” policies and the dividing line between price and non-price restraints – An analysis under U.S. antitrust and EU competition law in view of recent UK decisions
- Impressum
Articles in the same Issue
- Cover
- Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Veranstaltungshinweise
- Aufsätze
- Die Vergabe von Rettungsdienstleistungsaufträgen und -konzessionen nach neuem Vergaberecht
- The Role of Non-Coordinated Effects in the Assessment of Minority Shareholdings
- The EU Commission’s settlement practice
- Harmonisierung des Kartellbußgeldrechts qua effet utile?
- “Minimum Advertised Price” policies and the dividing line between price and non-price restraints – An analysis under U.S. antitrust and EU competition law in view of recent UK decisions
- Impressum
