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An efficiency defence for mergers: Putting an intricate puzzle together

Published/Copyright: October 1, 2015
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Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht
From the journal Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht Volume 1 Issue 3

Abstract

The EU merger control system is currently undergoing a reform. Alongside proposed changes to the EC Merger Regulation, the European Commission adopted draft guidelines for the appraisal of horizontal mergers. One important issue of the guidelines is the treatment of efficiencies within the appraisal of mergers. The purpose of this article is to analyse some of the key issues.

Abstract

The Comission as already addressed efficiency claims in past merger cases. However, there was some uncertainty about the meaning of Art. 2 (1) band to which extent efficiencies could play a decisive role in the assessment of mergers. The aim of the Draft Notice is to spell out a coherent approach. The example of the efficiencies section of the US-guidelines shows that the definit ion of the welfare standard and the standard of proof are key issues. The price standard, the focal point of the consumer welfare standard, certainly provides a useful starting point for the analyses of efficiency claims. However, one shold not loose sight of the fact that consumer welfare is a broader concept than just price. In the legal context of merger control the provisions of the Merger Regulation indicate that non-price parameters should be part of the analysis. As far as verifiability is concerned quantitative analysis is not a "sine qua non" for the analysis of efficiencies. However, for the commission to allow an efficiency defence argument, it must be possible to foresee a clearly identifiable impact on consumers, not a marginal one.

Published Online: 2015-10-01
Published in Print: 2003-08-01

© 2015 RWS Verlag Kommunikationsforum GmbH

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Aufsätze
  2. Anwendung der Kartellverfahrensordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 durch nationale Gerichte
  3. An efficiency defence for mergers: Putting an intricate puzzle together
  4. Vergaberechtlicher Rechtsschutz unterhalb der Schwellenwerte
  5. Wettbewerb in der Telekommunikation: Brauchen wir die ex-ante-Regulierung noch?
  6. Entscheidungsbesprechungen
  7. EU Merger Control at a Turning Point- the Court of First Instance's “Schneider” and “Tetra” judgments
  8. Erfüllen Kartellabsprachen den Tatbestand des Betrugs?
  9. Buchrezensionen
  10. Markt Macht Wettbewerb – Meine Erfahrungen als Kommissar in Brüssel
  11. Antitrust Law
https://doi.org/10.15375/zwer-2003-0302

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Aufsätze
  2. Anwendung der Kartellverfahrensordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003 durch nationale Gerichte
  3. An efficiency defence for mergers: Putting an intricate puzzle together
  4. Vergaberechtlicher Rechtsschutz unterhalb der Schwellenwerte
  5. Wettbewerb in der Telekommunikation: Brauchen wir die ex-ante-Regulierung noch?
  6. Entscheidungsbesprechungen
  7. EU Merger Control at a Turning Point- the Court of First Instance's “Schneider” and “Tetra” judgments
  8. Erfüllen Kartellabsprachen den Tatbestand des Betrugs?
  9. Buchrezensionen
  10. Markt Macht Wettbewerb – Meine Erfahrungen als Kommissar in Brüssel
  11. Antitrust Law
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