37. That things, opinions, and speech are called “true” or “false” in different senses; and why such expressions are called “modal”

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter I
2. PREFACE VII
3. CONTENTS IX
4. INTRODUCTION XV
5. PROLOGUE 3
6. BOOK ONE
7. 1. The false accusation that has evoked this rejoinder to Cornificius 9
8. 2. A description of Cornificius, without giving his name 12
9. 3. When, how, and by whom Cornificius was educated 13
10. 4. The lot of his companions in error 17
11. 5. What great men that tribe dares to defame, and why they do this 21
12. 6. The arguments on which Cornificius bases his contention 24
13. 7. Praise of Eloquence 26
14. 8. The necessity of helping nature by use and exercise 28
15. 9. That one who attacks logic is trying to rob mankind of eloquence 31
16. 10. What "logic" means, and how we should endeavor to acquire all arts that are not reprobate 32
17. 11. The nature of art, the various hinds of innate abilities, and the fact that natural talents should be cultivated and developed by the arts 33
18. 12. Why some arts are called "liberal" 36
19. 13. Whence grammar gets its name 37
20. 14. Although it is not natural, grammar imitates nature 38
21. 15. That adjectives of secondary application should not be copulated with nouns of primary application, as in the example "a patronymic horse" 41
22. 16. That adjectives of primary origin are copulated with nouns of primary application 47
23. 17. "That grammar also imitates nature in poetry 51
24. 18. What grammar should prescribe, and what it should forbid 52
25. 19. That a knowledge of figures [of speech] is most useful 56
26. 20. With what the grammarian should concern himself 58
27. 21. By what great men grammar has been appreciated, and the fact that ignorance of this art is as much a handicap in philosophy as is deafness and dumbness 60
28. 22. That Cornificius invokes the authority of Seneca to defend his erroneous contentions 62
29. 23. The chief aids to philosophical inquiry and the practice of virtue; as well as how grammar is the foundation of both philosophy and virtue 64
30. 24. Practical observations on reading and lecturing, together with [an account of] the method employed by Bernard of Chartres and his followers 65
31. 25. A short conclusion concerning the value of grammar. 72
32. BOOK TWO
33. [PROLOGUE] 73
34. 1. Because its object is to ascertain the truth, logic is a valuable asset in all fields of philosophy 74
35. 2. The Peripatetic school, and the origin and founder of logic 76
36. 3. That those who would philosophize should be taught logic. Also the distinction between demonstrative, probable, and sophistical logic 78
37. 4. What dialectic is, and whence it gets its name 80
38. 5. The subdivisions of the dialectical art, and the objective of logicians 81
39. 6. That all seek after logic, yet not all are successful in their quest 84
40. 7. That those who are verbal jugglers of irrelevant nonsense must first be disabused of their erring ways before they can come to know anything 88
41. 8. If they had but heeded Aristotle, he would have prevented them from going to extremes 90
42. 9. That dialectic is ineffective when it is divorced from other studies 93
43. 10. On whose authority the foregoing and following are based 95
44. 11. The limited extent of the efficacy of dialectic by itself 100
45. 12. The subject matter of dialectic, and the means it uses 101
46. 13. The tremendous value of a scientific knowledge of probable principles; and the difficulties involved in determining what principles are absolutely necessary 103
47. 14. More on the same subject 106
48. 15 . What is a dialectical proposition, and what is a dialectical problem 107
49. 16 . That all other teachers of this art [of dialectic] acknowledge Aristotle as their master 109
50. 17. In what a pernicious manner logic is sometimes taught; and the ideas of moderns about [the nature of] genera and species 111
51. 18. That men always alter the opinions of their predecessors 116
52. 19. Wherein teachers of this kind are not to be forgiven 117
53. 20. Aristotle's opinion concerning genera and species, supported by numerous confirmatory reasons and references to written works 118
54. BOOK THREE
55. [PROLOGUE] 142
56. 1. How one should lecture on Porphyry and other books 146
57. 2. The utility of the Categories, [some remarks concerning] their instruments 150
58. 3. What is the scope of the predicaments, and with what the prudent moderation of those who philosophize should rest content 155
59. 4. The scope and usefulness of the Periermenie [Interpretation], or more correctly of the Periermenias. 165
60. 5. What constitutes the body of the art, and [some remarks on] the utility of the Book of the Topics. 170
61. 6. The utility and scope of the [first] three books of the Topics 176
62. 7. A brief account of the fourth and fifth books [of the Topics] 179
63. 8. Of definition, the subject of the sixth book [of the Topics] 181
64. 9. The problem of identity and diversity, which is treated in the seventh book; together with some general observations concerning the Topics 185
65. 10. The utility of the eighth book [of the Topics] 189
66. BOOK FOUR
67. [PROLOGUE] 203
68. 1. The book of the Analytics examines reasoning. 204
69. 2. The universal utility of this science [of the Analytics], and the etymology of its title 205
70. 3. The book's utility does not include the provision of rhetorical expression 206
71. 4. The scope of the first book [of the Analytics] 207
72. 5. The scope of the second book [of the Analytics] 209
73. 6. The difficulty of the Posterior Analytics, and whence this [difficulty] proceeds 212
74. 7. Why Aristotle has come to be called the “philosopher” par excellence 213
75. 8. The [proper] junction of demonstrative logic, as well as the sources and techniques of demonstration. Also the fact that sensation is the basis of science, and how this is true 214
76. 9. What sensation is, and how it, together with imagination, is the foundation of every branch of philosophy 216
77. 10. The imagination, and the fact that it is the source of affections that either compose and order, or disturb and deform the soul 218
78. 11. The nature of imagination, together with remaps on opinion. Also how opinion or sensation may be deceived, and the origin of fronesis, which we call “prudence” 220
79. 12. The nature, subject matter, and activities of prudence; and how science originates from sensation 221
80. 13. The difference between “science” and “wisdom” and what is “faith” 222
81. 14. The relationship of prudence and truth, the origins of prudence, and the nature of reason 224
82. 15. More about what reason is, as well as the fact that the word "reason" has several different meanings, and that reasons are everlasting 225
83. 16. A distinction of various meanings [of the word “reason”], and the fact that brute animals do not possess reason, even though they may seem to have discernment. Also the origin of human reason according to the Hebrews 226
84. 17. Reasons junction; why sensation, which reason supervises, is situated in the head; and who are philology's servants 228
85. 18. The distinction between reason and [intuitive] understanding, and the nature of the latter 230
86. 19. The nature of wisdom, and the fact that, with the help of grace, wisdom derives [originally] from sense perception 231
87. 20. The cognition, simplicity, and immortality of the soul, according to Cicero 232
88. 21. Although Aristotle has not sufficiently discussed hypothetical [conditional] reasoning in the foregoing booths, he has, at it were, sowed seed for such a treatment 235
89. 22. Sophistry and its utility 236
90. 23. The Sophistical Refutations 238
91. 24. A word about those who disparage the works of Aristotle 240
92. 25. The fact that Cornificus is even more contemptible than Bromius, the buffoon of the gods. Also how Augustine and other philosophers praise logic 241
93. 26. What tactics we should employ against Cornificius and [other like] perverse calumniators [of logic] 242
94. 27. Although he has been mistaken on several points, Aristotle is preeminent in logic 243
95. 28. How logic should be employed 244
96. 29. That the temerity of adolescence should be restrained; why eloquence weds philology; and what should be our main objectives 245
97. 30. The fact that philology precedes its two sisters. Also what investigation by categories is appropriate in a discussion of reason and truth 247
98. 31. The nature of original reason, and some observations concerning philosophical sects 250
99. 32. What is opposed to reason, and the fact that the word "reason" has several different senses, as well as that reasons are eternal 252
100. 33. The imperfection of human reason; and the fact that the word “true” has various senses 253
101. 34. The etymology of the word uerum ["true"], the nature of truth, and what is contrary to truth 255
102. 35. More about truths, and the fact that things, words, and truths are said to exist in different ways, with an explanation of the latter 258
103. 36. The difference between things that are true and things that only seem to be true, according to the Platonists 261
104. 37. That things, opinions, and speech are called “true” or “false” in different senses; and why such expressions are called “modal” 263
105. 38. The intimate connection between reason and truth, with a brief explanation of the nature of each 266
106. 39. A continuation of the aforesaid [discussion]. Also the fact that neither reason nor truth have contraries 267
107. 40. The proper aim of the Peripatetics, as well as of all who philosophize correctly, and the eight obstacles to understanding 268
108. 41. [Untitled] [The limitations of reason and the function of faith] 272
109. 42. How the fact that the world is subject to vanity is confirmed by visible proofs, and why this book is now concluded 273
110. BIBLIOGRAPHY 277
111. INDEX 295