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Zur Reform der Altersvorsorge – ein konstitutionenökonomischer Vorschlag

  • Stefan Voigt EMAIL logo und Gert G. Wagner
Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 14. Mai 2016
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Abstract

Modifications in pay-as-you-go pension schemes are regularly met with broad public opposition. It is therefore rational for politicians who are interested in reelection to delay necessary reforms as long as possible. Short-termism is the result. Drawing on the concepts of constitutional economics, the characteristics of an old age provision system for which unanimous consent could be assumed are sketched. Then, a proposal to reform the current scheme is developed. Rather than discussing yet another formula, an institutional arrangement - a pension chamber - is proposed that sets incentives to take long run effects of old age provision systems explicitly into account. Recurring on political economy, it is shown that politicians can have an interest in the delegation of powers which is necessary for the implementation of the proposal.

Online erschienen: 2016-5-14
Erschienen im Druck: 2000-12-1

© 2000 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart

Heruntergeladen am 4.2.2026 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/zfwp-2000-0303/html?lang=de
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