Political evaluation of tourism impacts on residents and their domain – Conceptual considerations and a call for an imperative and freedom-based perspective

Introduction

One key element and goal of tourism policy is the balancing of interests between the tourism industry, the tourists and the residents in the respective destination. Such a balance is often achieved by addressing the tourism impact on the residents in a narrower sense (Nemec Rudez & Vodeb, 2010; Nunkoo & Ramkissoon, 2011) or sustainability in a rather holistic view (Castellani & Sala, 2010; Kuščer & Mihalič, 2019). The latter can still be attributed to a resident’s domain, if it is impacting the sustainability at the destination. Hence, an objective of tourism policy in this respect is to consider the quality of life aspects of both tourists and residents (Moon et al., 2019; Uysal & Sirgy, 2019) alongside economic and other implications of the tourism industry (Joppe, 2018; Krutwaysho & Bramwell, 2010).

Whereby it appears fair to postulate the goals of a tourism policy, evaluating the impact and effectiveness in balancing activities results in a variety of complex questions in regards to both ethical position and measurements. Traditionally, academia and research are addressing tourism policy predominantly from a utilitarian perspective (Dredge et al., 2012; Farsari et al., 2007; Jamal & Camargo, 2014; Lee, 2021; Reith & Nauright, 2005) or at least indicating such a dominance (Hall, 2019). For utilitarists, good tourism policy is obliged to consider the impacts and decide for the policy option that provides the best possible outcome, considering the likelihood of achievement (Ambrosie, 2010).

Despite a focus on quality of life aspects, indicating a human-centric and hence a humanistic view (Della Lucia et al., 2021), such a perspective leading to an utilitarian thinking is not without flaws. Even acknowledging a theoretically possible achievement of a best possible outcome for the human society involved, this benefit perspective is treating affected human beings as means for the purpose. In principle, this may be an acceptable approach considering the goal of achieving human virtue to the fullest extent and considering the emphasis on human condition (Melé, 2003). However, such a thinking is assuming that human virtue and human condition can be generalized in a way that it is only positively affecting humanity, human societies and individuals alike.

Thus, tourism policy would combine utilitarianism and humanistic approaches only in those cases where the common utilitarian benefit is also a benefit for the individual human being, or at least a benefit for a human being sharing a humanistic view on the world. The following paper does not aim to answer whether this can be true. In fact, each attempt in doing so is doomed to fail. However, it shall serve as an attempt to conceptualize possibilities in which tourism policy can achieve a positive outcome from a humanistic perspective for the tourism system, including tourists, residents and industry alike.

Residents quality of life – hedonic and eudemonic interpretation

Taking human virtue as a basis for defining the residents’ quality of life immediately leads to the question of defining the virtue of residents. Tourism science traditionally focuses on two distinct concepts of individual virtue: hedonia and eudaimonia. Both focus on the individual ‘gain’ of a person, either linked to the individual pursuit of happiness by pleasure and comfort or the development of the best possible self (Huta & Ryan, 2010). Such a gain may be the outcome of a touristic experience (Knobloch et al., 2017), which could be the result of the experience as a tourist or with a tourist.

So, in a tourism context, an individual may be both a driving or affected force of touristic experience impacting quality of life. Hence, each quality of life discussion must address the possible conflict of tourist quality of life versus resident’s quality of life. The tourism industry and tourism policy in this respect serve as facilitators of both the possible conflict itself and the resolution of it. Both present moderating as well as facilitating elements of the quality of life experience. Just focusing on the tourist-resident nexus, the interaction of both represents the area where the individual quality of life mechanisms directly matches and impact each other (Uysal et al., 2012).

Instead of just addressing tourism policy’s and industry’s roles in facilitating quality of life, both also enjoy a de-facto obligation to address the interaction and take a decision on the relative importance of conflicting interaction results. For the tourism industry, addressing the interaction may be a moral obligation, but will fall short in reality as the industry’s goal is profit generation (Johnston & Tyrrell, 2005), whereby this may be clouded by the goal of providing travel opportunities (Ho & McKercher, 2004). Despite a similar ‘reality concern’ for tourism policy, it cannot easily hide from taking careful evaluation of the interaction between tourists and residents. Additionally, it also has to decide whether an individual disadvantage is acceptable for the purpose of the greater good.

Where it appears morally obvious that pure hedonia-based virtues shall not lead to a disbenefit of affected individuals in the tourist-resident nexus, the question is more difficult to answer from an eudemonic perspective. Tourism-related activities may provide overall holistic benefits and result in the tourism society achieving an eudemonic improvement, but still negatively impact individuals. This drives the question: is it morally acceptable to force individuals to sacrifice on personal benefits for the sake of a society? Again, should this only affect hedonic benefits, it might be considered acceptable. But it becomes a different story for tourism policy having to deal with scenarios where individuals have to sacrifice their eudemonic improvement for the sake of the greater benefit of society.

Policymakers’ utilitarian evaluation issues

Such a conflict is difficult to solve for a variety of reasons: Apart from defining which interests are based on hedonia and which on eudaimonia, it has to be defined how useful each interest is from a society perspective. This focus on utility requires an assumed ‘ex-post’ consequence for an ‘ex-ante’ activity. This issue is often not expressly addressed, given most decisions are justified and analysed from an ex-post perspective (Hwang & Lee, 2015; Iglesias et al., 2018; Schulenkorf, 2009; Zalatan, 2004), whereby the actual decision process of policymakers requires an ex-ante perspective (Schulenkorf, 2009; Tsai & Chen, 2021).

Apart from this temporal issue, an utilitarian assessment is furthermore lacking a ‘quantifiable’ comparison. It is almost impossible to weigh impacts and benefits within this comparison in a number-oriented accurate way or to even define clear criteria for an utilitarian evaluation (García-Rosell & Mäkinen, 2013; Sirgy & Su, 2000). On top of this, each assessment that leads to a clear comparability leads to the requirement of possessing the capability of even executing such an assessment, assuming there is an a priori possibility to weigh in different aspects.

In addition, a utilitarian evaluation has to define the point or period that shall define the outcome. Similar to this, it needs to be defined which comparative element is applied. Does the total benefit for a society apply, or does the focus require an average benefit for each individual affected or concerned (Blackorby et al., 1995)? Whereby an average benefit appears to be more humanistic it shall not convey the fact that even this more human-centric approach is focusing on the benefit as a concept and not the beneficiary.

Policy implementation – Hegelian style

Regardless of the actual benefits evaluation, it raises a question about tourism policy being able to assess such benefits in the first place and, subsequently, put them into a comparative order with competing interests and benefits. Positions claiming even the idealistic capability of tourism policy and the actors involved ultimately propose an objective truth and reality that can be digested. Obviously, such an approach in the real world proposes either supernatural abilities or an inhuman approach purely based on ‘mathematical’ logic.

From a political philosophy perspective this results in the necessity of a higher authority to decide about the utilitarian evaluation or at least an authority that justifies such a decision. Such an authority has to follow an objective principle that produces an acceptable decision for all parties involved and within liberal societies also has to guarantee freedom and autonomy of people. Without the actual existence of an objective authority, it requires a conceptual objective authority. The objective spirit proposed by Hegel provides such a conceptual idea (Kervegan, 1988; Thompson, 2014).

According to Hegelian interpretations, the objective spirit is more than the sum of independent spirits, wishes and wills (Pauly, 2000). Taking this into account, the superiority is relying on an external justification and, hence, moves the human person away from the centre of evaluation. As such it appears likely that political decisions, despite being made in the best interest, will focus on the society as an institutional whole instead of its members. Within the tourism context, the political evaluation in the resident-tourist nexus is focusing neither on residents nor tourists; it is focusing on the nexus and its meaning for the tourism system or affected society.

Such a way of evaluation is neglecting the interests of all participants in the nexus. Neither the interest of tourists nor the residents, including their domain interest in e. g. environmental protection (Jamal & Getz, 1999), are taken into focus of consideration. Likewise, the interests of the remaining members of the tourism system are not in focus. By default, this does not necessarily mean an inhuman evaluation, but the potential risk exists.

The imperative alternative

Within political and legal philosophy Hegel is promoting a stronger state and subsequently a strong influence of public policy on the welfare of society. This is the direct opposite of the state scepticism promoted by Kant (Pfordten, 2020). As Hegel and Kant seem to represent contrasting opposites, it might be therefore worthwhile to check whether this opposite provides an alternative to the utilitarian evaluation dilemma.

Kant is probably most known for his categorial imperative guiding morally right actions. The imperative is expressed most famously in two ways that could be useful for this conceptual consideration:

1. Act only according to that maxim that you wish to accept becoming a universal law at the time (Kant, 2019) (author’s own translation).

2. Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in yourself or in the person of any other only as an independent purpose and never as means for other people’s purpose (Kant, 2019) (author’s own translation).

The second version of the imperative especially already describes a more humanistic perspective. Each human being is fulfilling an individual purpose by its own means. Hence, nobody, including policymakers, should ignore or neglect this individual purpose. Any other evaluation that treats an individual means for another purpose is non-humanistic in comparison to that evaluation.

The imperative inherits a methodologically complex issue. Each human being shall follow the categorial imperative, but it is deemed impossible to determine a positive action according to it (Bordum, 2005; Potter Jr. & Nelson T., 1975; Scarre, 1998). The imperative in this context may only be used to evaluate an existing action ex post and not ex ante (Potter Jr. & Nelson T., 1975). Which again leads to the problem described in the introduction and results in an issue to propose a policy decision based on the categorial imperative. If a policy decision is only to be evaluated after it is implemented, it may be evaluated from a more humanistic perspective, but not necessarily resulting in more humanistic tourism policies.

One aspect of Kantian philosophy does assist in this respect, given the categorial imperative does rely on the possibility of self-legislation of mankind (Bordum, 2005). This self-legislation can serve as a basis for ongoing discussion and evaluations. Closely connected to self-legislation is the concept of freedom (ibid.). Kant himself differentiated various concepts of freedom (Graband, 2005). In the context of the paper, the exact definition of freedom is not necessary to determine a humanistic approach on ex-ante policy decisions. It is sufficient to utilize the concept of freedom in regards to the human capacity of self-legislation.

A tale of three freedoms – Practical concordance in tourism policy

Utilizing the idea of freedom, we may consider the actors in the tourism system as possessors of self-legislating freedom. In other words, tourists, residents and representatives of the tourism industry and subsequently the tourism industry itself possess the freedom of actions based on self-legislation.

This itself does not necessarily mean each participant is acting in a morally right way. Considering both the impossibility to define this ex-ante and the difficulties of actors facilitating this in the first place, the idea of self-legislation requires some sort of support to become fruitful. Putting the first problem aside and concentrating on the second, the following is obvious:

Each actor that utilizes its freedom to self-legislate corresponding actions is, consciously or unconsciously, focusing on its own interest and name this an action of ‘free will’. According to Kant, this itself is wrong as only an action that is corresponding with the law of morals are considering an action of free will; all other actions are an expression of free arbitrariness (Kant, 2015). So, accepting the self-legislating power of the tourism actors and their capability to act because of free arbitrariness as a result of this power, without the possibility to enforce a morally right ‘free will’ action, tourism policy requires a scheme to ensure that possible conflicts of ‘free arbitrariness’ of actors do not lead to an ignorance of the categorial imperative. In other words, tourism policy needs to accept the existence of arbitrary actions and to ensure that none of the actors is using other actors as means for the individual purpose.

A concept that is proposing an assistance is the concept of practical concordance developed by Hesse (1999). Originally this idea was developed to address conflicts and tensions of freedom or other constitutional rights in constitutional law and is considered a de facto standard element of constitutional law evaluation (Schladebach, 2004). However, it is not limited to jurisprudence but impacts other policy aspects as legislation and execution of policies as well (ibid.). This allows the utilization also in this context. Hesse’s idea was built to guarantee that in case of a tension or conflict of rights within the constitution, all affected rights are balanced in a way that each right is capable to fulfil its purpose in the most optimal way. No right shall supersede any other right in a way that the other right’s capability in achieving effectiveness is diminished or unnecessarily limited (Hesse, 1999).

Within the context of the three freedoms addressed here, practical concordance can be understood as a balancing approach ensuring that freedom of one actor is not limiting the freedoms of all other actors in a way that the latter do not enjoy effective freedom to act. Whereby, it has to be acknowledged that the actor’s domain may have conflicting positions internally as well, which will not be addressed further, given the complexity. But the discussed principles apply as well.

To illustrate the practical use of the concordance, the following thoughts will be used as a simplification: Within a popular tourism destination, the tourist does want to explore the destination at their convenience, the tourism industry would like to bring as many tourists as possible into a destination and the residents would like to carry on their normal life. With the absence of tourism policy this would lead to chaos and tremendous overtourism, where the interest of the industry tends to win at the expense of tourists’ experience and the quality of life of residents.

Following a utilitarian approach, tourism policy might consider the tourist experience as important for long-term economic development and put measures in place to produce a positive tourism experience. As this is limiting the number of tourists being able to visit the destination at the same time, it restricts the industry’s interests a bit. However, it is not putting the same emphasize on the resident’s perspective (Easterling, 2004) and may allow tourism around the clock, if tourism development is perceived to bring the greatest possible value for society.

Taking an imperative approach would require policy-makers to find a compromise and balance the freedoms in a way that each of them achieves an effective optimum, e. g. a price-based visitor management could assist. Such an approach does limit the impact on residents, but also allows tourists to visit the destination and the industry to sell trips. If it is combined with a social status-based subsidy, it might even further enhance the balance as it still makes the destination accessible for low income tourists.

Concluding remarks and practical implication

With its origin in legal science, the proposed practical concordance combined with an imperative-based evaluation is providing a novel point of view for tourism policy decisions. This novelty obviously does not make a statement on superiority. The proposed imperative-based approach is not necessarily better or worse when compared to an utilitarian evaluation. In fact, the outcome may be identical, as affected freedoms do have a link to utilitarian common goods. As a practical result, the concordance may even foster the same policy decisions, acknowledging similar positive societal outcomes as a result of freedom. However, as it puts the individual and its freedom into the centre of consideration, it is more humanistic.

From a practical perspective, it may be easier for policy-makers to implement a freedom-based evaluation, as the focus on individual freedoms appears easier to facilitate compared to a complex impact and benefit assessment. Due to the link between policy and legal aspects, it may also be a rather natural way in justifying policy decisions without the requirement of transferring the whole decision onto expert knowledge in the various fields affected. In addition, it might assist in residents’ support for tourism, as their individual interests are an important component of evaluation (Meimand et al., 2017; Vargas-Sánchez et al., 2014).

Despite the paper’s focus on humanistic tourism policy, the wider impact shall not be ignored. Critics may proclaim that a human-centric tourism policy is ignoring the rights and freedoms of animals and the environment as a whole. But the opposite is true for the expressed thoughts. Increasing the loss of biodiversity and degrading the environment as a whole is simultaneously attacking the freedom. The tourism industry will have less freedom in promoting tourism activities. Likewise, tourists will have less freedom in their choices of tourism experiences (Hall, 2022). And also residents will suffer and lose part of their freedom (Lee & Jan, 2019). All of this may not be a freedom-based issue today, but definitely tomorrow.