A. Introduction[1]
1My last multi-year overview of significant developments in the tort laws of Europe was written in 2016 on the occasion of the 15th Annual Conference on European Tort Law.[2] Due to the pandemic, a follow-up report initially envisaged five years later for the 2021 conference and intended to cover the first two decades of said conference series was postponed to this year, which is why, technically, this paper is based on 21 volumes of the Yearbook on European Tort Law.[3]
2This conference series itself and the accompanying Yearbook publications need to be showcased upfront. Apart from insights into national legislation and academic writing, the reporters have so far submitted a grand total of more than 4,500 cases, which are presented not only in the Yearbooks, but also in our Eurotort database.[4] I dare claim that there is no other area of the law whose comprehensive comparative coverage across Europe matches this extraordinary achievement.
3As unavoidable for such a long-term report, I will not be able to highlight all (not even all significant) legislation and case law reported over more than two decades. Instead, I will try to select a few snapshots of trends which stand out according to my own subjective analysis. Needless to say, I have to resume from where I left in 2016, which is why many trends identified then will still be relevant in today’s extended overview. I will, however, prioritise developments ever since in the following.
4One aspect that may be expected in this paper but will not be addressed is the Covid-19 pandemic. The reason why we could not meet at all in 2020 and only virtually in 2021 and 2022 has already left its mark also upon tort law practice, of course, if only by the adoption of at least temporary measures regarding the prescription of claims as well as the introduction or adjustment of vaccination compensation schemes.[5] However, while cases concerning State liability for lockdown measures or vaccination cases have already been filed and more are to be expected, it will take a while before they reach the respective supreme courts in a significant number of countries. It is therefore a topic to be expected for a future long-term comparative report and probably premature at this point.
B. Tort Law Legislation
5The most obvious changes to tort law are brought about by legislators, and we have seen an abundance of new or amended statutory provisions over these past two decades, the introduction of entirely new or adjustments to existing legislative instruments, and even the recodification of entire civil codes or at least of the law of obligations as a whole in some countries.[6]
1. Recodification of Entire Civil Codes or of the Laws of Obligations in General
6In retrospect, it seems that the more dramatic the renewal of the law in the books appeared, the fewer changes it actually brought about, at least to the practice of tort law. On second thought, this may not be quite as surprising – after all, the task of replacing an entire civil code, for example, opens up so many battle grounds on so many levels in so many different areas of private law that the energy to completely rehaul one of its key parts may not suffice to actually achieve a revolutionary outcome in the end.
7The most recent example for such developments is Belgium, where a new civil code is on its way,[7] with some parts already in force.[8] However, while the original draft of the new tort law provisions[9] suggests an introduction of quite some important and laudable changes, it seems that the (justified) ambitions of the drafters were not fully appreciated by those who should now contribute to making this into law. It therefore remains to be seen how long it will take until Book 6 of the new Civil code will see the light of promulgation day, and how much of the original draft text will make it into law.
8This delay may come as a relief of sorts to neighbouring France, the motherland of the Belgian Code civil. A comprehensive reform of the law of obligations had started much sooner there, in the wake of the bicentennial of the Code Napoléon,[10] but still has not come to an end in the ‘Journal officiel de la République française’. This is not apparent at first sight, though – after all, perhaps the most dramatic change from a comparative lawyer’s perspective was the renumbering of the entire law of obligations and therefore also of its tort law provisions. What was previously to be found in art 1382 ff Code civil is now in art 1240 ff, thereby inter alia moving the famous (or notorious) art 1384 to 1242, the new place for the old liability for things (responsabilité du fait des choses). Still, it was really just a renumbering and not a rewording, deemed necessary in the sweeping 2016 recodification of the law of obligations that bypassed the law of delict at the time, though.[11] The actual substantive reform of French tort law is still in the pipeline, however, despite occasional steps (more or less) forward as reported over the years.[12] While there are obviously more pressing matters at the moment, it is still deplorable that ‘the initial enthusiasm ... has turned into a diffuse sense of consternation and faithlessness’.[13]
2. Reforms of the Law of Delict in Particular
9The fate of reform projects focusing exclusively on tort law (as if that were not enough in and of itself, though) was equally mixed over these past two decades. While some countries succeeded in introducing even rather substantial reforms,[14] others stopped midway and failed to finalise more or less ambitious projects introduced and debated over the years covered by this report.[15] As with more comprehensive legislative projects mentioned earlier, we have therefore heard about reform plans in this conference series which were not always followed by a notification of completion of such initiatives in one of the subsequent years.
10From a comparative perspective, perhaps the most interesting developments – a rollercoaster of tort scholars’ emotions – concerned the Swiss reform draft, as already highlighted in 2016.[16] While it deplorably ultimately failed in Switzerland,[17] Turkey subsequently used significant parts of this draft as an inspiration to update its own tort law provisions accordingly.[18] It is ironic that the country into which the Swiss codification was transplanted in 1926 now has the more advanced version of the original.[19] Like the Swiss draft, also an Austrian attempt at a full recodification of the tort law provisions of the ABGB was inter alia based on comparative analyses to support it, but the Austrian draft equally did not survive the fierce debates that it triggered.[20]
3. Tort Law Updates on a Smaller Scale
11The fact that some countries aimed at a comprehensive reform of their laws of delict or even of their entire civil codes does not mean that legislators in other jurisdictions have ignored tort law entirely over the past decades. After all, there is an abundance of more or less far-reaching singular legislative interventions which have modernised the respective country’s approach to allocate risks, in addition to necessary implementations of EU directives.[21]
12Apart from State liability,[22] this affected such diverse aspects as compensation for the non-pecuniary loss of secondary victims,[23] prescription,[24] as well as environmental[25] and medical liability. In the last category falls the Italian legge Gelli-Bianco,[26] for example, the introduction of a no-fault medical liability regime in Lithuania,[27] or the inclusion of specific rules on medical treatment contracts into the German BGB, with the latter transcribing existing case law rather than innovating the rules.[28]
13It is also interesting to note that a fierce debate in Germany at the beginning of the millennium as to whether and how small claims in tort law should be curtailed (with an eye specifically to whiplash injuries) ultimately failed there[29] but succeeded almost two decades later in England even though it was also ‘extremely controversial’ there as well.[30]
14Furthermore, updates that significantly shape the practice of tort law do not necessarily originate on the floors of some legislative body. This is true in particular for guidelines and similar practice tools such as the Irish Personal Injuries Guidelines[31] or the Ogden Tables, the famous English tool for calculating lump sum awards for future pecuniary losses resulting from bodily harm and fatal injuries.[32]
15Some legislative achievements reported over these past two decades seem worthy of adoption in other countries as well but unfortunately do not (yet) seem to inspire legislators elsewhere. One such example is the Apologies (Scotland) Act of 2016,[33] which ‘has the simple, focused purpose of providing that in any civil legal proceedings ... an apology made outside the proceedings (a) is not admissible as evidence of anything relevant to determination of liability in connection with the proceedings and (b) cannot be used in any other way to the prejudice of the person who made the apology.’[34] This would seem an important clarification in particular for medical malpractice cases throughout Europe, if only as an incentive to ‘making amends’ outside of litigation.[35]
4. Proposals for Harmonisation
16In the first half of this two decades survey period, two substantial proposals to harmonise tort law in Europe were published, the ‘Principles of European Tort Law’ (PETL) by the European Group on Tort Law[36] and the ‘Principles of European Law on Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another’ (PEL Liab Dam) by the Study Group on a European Civil Code.[37] While the Study Group no longer seems to be active, the European Group on Tort Law is currently preparing an update to their original draft.[38]
17The impact of neither of these two drafts can easily be measured. However, draft reform projects thereafter did at least consider them,[39] and several supreme court decisions took notice of the proposals.[40]
5. Brussels Calling?
18While those two drafts of ‘Principles’[41] of the laws of delict in Europe were not meant to serve as a blueprint for a European instrument,[42] but rather as a basis for future work towards approximation, either on a national level or by the EU, it is obvious that the latter addressee has not heard that call yet.[43] It is not even clear whether that would be the appropriate forum for such an interference with existing tort law cultures in Europe,[44] let alone whether and to what extent harmonisation would be desirable at all, whether it would be politically feasible and indeed work in practice. After all, the rather, well, mixed experience with the Product Liability Directive (PLD)[45] in its first decades was not encouraging in that respect.[46] This may have been at least one of the reasons why the Commission even expressly excluded the option to extend efforts to harmonise contract law to tort law at the beginning of the millennium.[47]
19This does not mean that nothing of relevance for tort law happened in EU legislation over these past two decades. Perhaps the most significant legislative act adopted by the EU was the 2007 Rome II Regulation,[48] finally harmonising conflicts of tort laws to a considerable degree.[49] The European motor insurance scheme benefitting victims of traffic accidents has been updated multiple times since the turn of the millennium,[50] with the most recent amendments adopted in 2021.[51] Other means of transportation were addressed by some EU laws as well.[52] Specific loss scenarios arising out of infringements of data protection[53] or harmful anti-competitive conduct[54] were also tackled by the EU legislators.
20However, in most recent years, some seismic activity can be sensed indicating the possibility of at least some further steps towards harmonising at least some further aspects of delictual liability, including a face-lift of the PLD with a possible expansion of its scope.
21This change of pace was clearly triggered by the evolution of technology. Digital technologies in general and artificial intelligence (AI) in particular became priority topics for the Commission,[55] which invariably inter alia raised questions of how to deal with their possibly harmful side-effects, if only in order to provide for a predictable framework for the industries to proceed with their research in these fields. When the European Parliament published its ‘Resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics’ in 2017,[56] the political pressure on the Commission to act increased. In the following year, the Commission published a Staff Working Document on ‘Liability for emerging digital technologies’[57] accompanying a Communication from the Commission to the other institutions on ‘Artificial Intelligence for Europe’.[58] In the same year, the Commission set up an ‘Expert Group on Liability for New Technologies’, which had two sub-groups. While the first[59] was instructed to assess the PLD in light of the preceding (fifth) evaluation of this instrument,[60] the second formation had the more general task of examining ‘whether and to what extent existing liability schemes are adapted to the emerging market realities following the development of the new technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, advanced robotics, the IoT and cybersecurity issues’.[61] This so-called ‘New Technologies Formation’ (NTF) published its final report in November 2019.[62]
22The first (PLD) formation never produced a concluding document, and it initially appeared that they would not call for a substantive change to the black-letter text of the PLD itself.[63] However, the apparent reluctance of the Commission to update the PLD seems to have changed in the meantime, and a reform of the PLD as such is very likely at this point. The Commission launched a public consultation in 2021 on ‘Civil Liability – Adapting Liability Rules to the Digital Age and Artificial Intelligence’,[64] which inter alia expressly considered that ‘the Product Liability Directive ... may ... need to be adapted’.[65] How far such changes will go, and whether previously disputed aspects of the PLD with no immediate relevance for new technologies specifically will also be reconsidered (such as the € 500 threshold for property damage or the development risk defence)[66] remains to be seen.
23Another question mark remains – if the PLD were indeed to be amended, will it extend to AI, and, irrespective thereof, will there be another separate instrument addressing liability for AI, either as a standalone piece of legislation or complementing the new PLD? After all, the European Parliament already took a bold step forward in 2020 by proposing a full-fledged regulation (!) on liability for AI.[67] So far, the Commission has at least taken preparatory steps for such a possible instrument on liability for AI, inter alia by commissioning a study on the current responses to the risks of AI in the Member States’ leges latae.[68] The next five-year report in this series will hopefully already know the outcome of these current developments.
C. Select Tort Law Trends
24As already mentioned in the introduction, the greatest achievement of this conference and book series is the massive collection of court decisions accumulated over more than two decades (in addition to the reports of all relevant legislation enacted throughout those years). Regular guests to the annual conference will share my own experience – it is fascinating how these annual reports gradually depict waves of themes sweeping through most jurisdictions covered. A problem raised before one court in one year may reappear in other countries in the following years, and what initially sounds like a singular novelty at first eventually turns into a European-wide trend, evidenced by a number of cases.
1. Damage and Compensable Losses
a) Wrongful Birth – Wrongful Life – Wrongful Conception
25The best example thereof were the problems known as ‘wrongful birth’, ‘wrongful life’, and ‘wrongful conception’, ie cases where prospective parents were deprived of their right to choose. While there were obviously some cases around Europe already before this series started, this set of ethically and dogmatically challenging questions became a recurring theme reappearing in every single volume of the Yearbook series, typically in multiple jurisdictions.[69] It was also featured in one of the special sessions of the ACET.[70]
b) Non-Pecuniary Loss of Secondary Victims
26Another unmissable recurring theme which produced a still bigger wave of court decisions and even legislation is the question whether and to what extent secondary victims can be compensated for non-pecuniary harm they themselves incur because of the death or substantial bodily injury of the primary victim, who is typically a close family member.[71] The recoverability of such harm, in particular if it was ‘mere’ bereavement and not the consequence of a (bodily or mental) injury of the secondary victim herself, was gradually admitted over the time span of this conference series in almost all jurisdictions, though in two countries only with (fairly recent) legislative intervention.[72]
27Differences still remain, particularly with respect to the key question of who is eligible and what relation of proximity between the primary and the secondary victim is required. The amounts awarded are obviously also quite different in comparison.[73] Some jurisdictions reduce it to cases of fatal injuries of the primary victim, although that restriction is apparently in retreat – more and more countries also indemnify family members whose relatives survived, but only with severe injuries. The latter was also promoted by both of the two harmonisation projects mentioned earlier.[74]
c) Non-Pecuniary Loss of Legal Persons
28Speaking of non-pecuniary harm – another theme which is actually still on the rise concerns the protection of personality rights of legal persons and whether these can be compensated for violations thereof. As long as these infringements lead to economic harm such as loss of profits, eg if the reputation of a company is smeared, which deters customers, the compensability of such damage will hardly be disputed.
29It is still not equally clear whether legal persons can also suffer non-pecuniary harm and whether tort law needs to remedy this.[75] As the Spanish reporters to the second Yearbook stated:
‘The existence of non-pecuniary loss for a company is a contradiction, as the loss of reputation that it could suffer in certain circumstances always causes an increase of costs, loss of earnings, etc. and all of them will be compensated with money. Obviously, a legal person cannot suffer anguish, anxiety or pain, which explains the difficulty in speaking of a notion of non-pecuniary loss including damage suffered by companies that finally have to be compensated with an amount of money.’[76]
30Others have argued, for example, that it is not a company as such that feels pain or shame, but its officers on behalf of the company, and since the company acts through such officers, whose actions are attributed to the legal person, why should the emotions of these officers experienced in that function not equally count as the company’s own sentiments?[77]
31The trend is clearly towards increasingly recognising and therefore compensating non-pecuniary losses of legal persons,[78] as sympathy of courts increases for shielding corporations and organisations from defamation and similar infringements, which may have been boosted by the rise of the Internet and its multiplying effect of such wrongdoings.[79]
32Remaining differences between jurisdictions presumably originate in their respective conceptions of personality rights, leading to divergences on a more fundamental level.[80] There may be more consensus when it comes to specific personality rights such as the right to one’s name, which can undoubtedly be exercised by a legal person as well. There are other personality rights which humans clearly enjoy but cannot (or at least should not) be protected for legal persons accordingly. As I already stated in my 2005 Comparative Report, it would be hard to bear if, for example, companies enjoyed a right to life which might ultimately preclude bankruptcy proceedings.[81]
d) Fear of Harm as a Standalone Loss
33As already highlighted in my 15-years report,[82] the recognition of claimants’ fear of harm (without having incurred any actual damage yet) became increasingly relevant, and this is a continuing trend. The Dutch reporters in 2018, for example, pointed to ‘the increasing attention given to “the fear of harm turning into standalone loss” (angstschade)’ in academia and court practice.[83] This phenomenon shows twofold: first, courts are more and more willing to compensate claimants for the emotional (and therefore non-pecuniary) harm resulting from their fear of future losses, although the latter typically need to be substantial and concrete, such as dangers to life or bodily integrity. The novelty here is the move from secondary non-pecuniary losses (linked to a mental illness developing because of – justified – fear) to primary non-pecuniary harm (‘fear as such’), similar to the developments regarding bereavement damages.[84] Second, also other (‘traditional’) losses are compensated, which moves the focus from damage to causation. The most prominent example for the latter is still the Boston Scientific ruling of the CJEU where inter alia the costs of preventive surgery to replace possibly defective pacemakers and implantable cardioverter defibrillators were recognised as compensable under the PLD,[85] even though the court there misunderstood the dogmatic problem and still treated it as a matter of defining damage.[86]
2. Specific Liability Scenarios
34This is not the place to showcase the full bandwidth of torts or bases of liability, or even some statistically dominant groups of cases such as traffic or medical liability, or even more specific topics such as cases involving animals.[87] Needless to say, there was an abundance of case law in all possible areas of tort law. Instead, I will only focus on a few very specific grounds of liability.
a) Environmental Harm and Sustainability
35It may come as no surprise that liability for environmental harm is continuing to trend in tort law.[88] ‘Fridays for Future’ and similar more recent movements raising awareness of the imminent dangers of climate change in the public at large clearly further boosted developments in the law as well, of course. As in the past, these not only include the aspect of compensable loss (by recognising environmental harm as such and by linking it to a specific claimant or to a representative group of claimants),[89] but also the grounds of liability.[90]
36The most prominent example of the former kind is the addition of an entirely new chapter to the French tort law provisions in the Code civil (now arts 1246–1252)[91] in 2016,[92] defining pure environmental harm (préjudice écologique) in art 1247 and determining in art 1248 who may claim remedies. These are defined in art 1249 ff, which could serve as a model also elsewhere – not only do these provisions confirm that restoration in kind is the primary remedy of choice, they also inter alia foresee that monetary compensation may be awarded to the State even if the latter is not the claimant.[93] Furthermore, irrespective of (and in addition to) any award of compensation, the judge may order the defendant to stop pollution and to prevent future harm (art 1252 Code civil).
37The Dutch Urgenda litigation, culminating in the Hoge Raad ruling at the end of 2019,[94] was on top of the headlines not only in legal scholarship. The Dutch State was obliged to take measures to reduce greenhouse gases by 25 % by the end of 2020,[95] based on a violation of the UN Climate Convention and on the State’s duty to protect the lives and wellbeing of its citizens as protected by arts 2 and 8 ECHR. One can only concur with the Dutch reporters:
‘This case has transformed Dutch climate change policy and inspired climate change cases in many other countries. The lesson to be learned is that courts can initiate change, provided that the other branches of government are willing to accept it.‘[96]
38The RWE litigation in Germany,[97] on the other hand, did not yet result in a ruling for the plaintiff, but unlike the Urgenda case, the setting there is much different, making the outcome in first instance less of a surprise.[98] After all, it was started by a single Peruvian farmer who had sued the German energy provider RWE to contribute to the cost of constructing a dam in his neighbourhood, which allegedly became necessary due to global warming, which in turn he claimed was to blame inter alia on RWE’s actions in Germany. The amount he asks for is calculated as a percentage of the overall cost of the dam corresponding to RWE’s contributions to global carbon dioxide emissions (0.47 %). It is not self-evident, to say the least, however, why it is the plaintiff individually who should collect monies for erecting a dam protecting the entire region,[99] and how the causation question can be resolved without ignoring the applicable German law[100] entirely. One has to wonder how filing such a case with rather limited chances to ultimately succeed[101] truly helps the global cause (as the Urgenda case presumably did), or whether it turns out to be counter-productive in the long run.[102]
39Other not so promising developments were reported from Switzerland, where a bold legislative initiative to hold businesses accountable not only for violations of human rights, but also for the environmental harm they or their subsidiaries cause (both domestically and abroad) ultimately failed due to lack of sufficient support in the population.[103]
b) Public Authority Liability
40In 2006, a special session of the Annual Conference discussed public liability.[104] One decade later, the European Group on Tort Law published its comparative study on State liability.[105] As Ken Oliphant noted in his introduction to this volume:
‘In the last decades, liability relating to public authorities ... has been one of the main focuses of development in and at the edges of tort law in Europe, with major reforms implemented or considered at national level, and a steady stream of major court decisions.’[106]
41It is not an easy task to give an overview of the practice of public authority liability – after all, in some jurisdictions, medical malpractice in State-run hospitals is adjudicated in the administrative court system, in others, the State is the direct provider of healthcare to begin with. Furthermore, schools or other educational facilities may be public or private entities, rendering a comparison of cases dealing with harm caused or incurred by pupils a complicated task. State liability of the Francovich kind[107] and other variations of liability at EU level[108] are yet another specific breed which needs to be distinguished as well.
42Nevertheless, it is obvious that liability of the State or other public authorities has become an increasingly relevant part of tort law practice overall in the course of the past two decades, not only because of updates to or recodification of statutes governing State liability. The Eurotort database at present features about 600 cases dealing with harm caused in the course of the exercise of public authority. Already in my 2016 report, the footnote listing the cases of the first 15 years span over two pages.[109] The examples of case law and legislation ever since is also a rather extensive list.[110]
43The reasons for this ongoing development are manifold, but one is left with the impression that the deep pocket argument perhaps remains at the forefront still of this expansion. If no one else is to blame, why not go after the State? That this mentality has grown in society could be experienced to the extreme over these past two years of the pandemic and will certainly generate food for future comparative reports and other studies.
44Some peculiar aspects of State liability are growing stronger within that category, in particular tortious liability of lawmakers for flawed legislation[111] or liability for court (even supreme court) rulings.[112]
c) Financial Market Torts
45In my 2016 report, the shockwave of the financial crisis that started in 2007 had not yet completely subsided, and courts were still struggling with clean-up work. By the time, case law against the key players had already accumulated.[113] The Annual Conference devoted a special session to the topic in 2013.[114]
46Needless to say, also the years ever since showed quite some activity in this field in the jurisdictions covered.[115] Nevertheless, I still think that from a dogmatic point of view, this is less of a distinctive category of cases inasmuch as the degree of novelty they bring to the overall analysis of tort law is rather limited. After all, we are dealing with more traditional (albeit pure economic) losses attributed according to fairly straightforward concepts.[116] However, when it comes to damage to the economy as such (whether reduced to a domestic market or beyond, all the way up to the world market), I doubt that tort law offers the proper toolbox to handle such cases, if only due to the sheer volume of losses and victims it would involve, let alone the complexity of identifying which conduct or activity led to which detrimental consequence.
d) Cyber Torts
47Another set of problems singled out as a feature topic in an Annual Conference[117] are so-called cyber torts (even though the term itself is quite diffuse).[118] It goes without saying that such harmful activities have not abruptly stopped since the 2016 report,[119] where I had grouped them into a distinct category, though without being fully convinced that these deserve to be set apart as much.[120]
48I had, however, conceded at the time (and still believe) that there are some unique features of such cases, which may ultimately justify discussing them separately from the run-of-the-mill tort cases. Just think of the complexity of proving causation, the potentially global effect of wrongdoings (both with respect to the number of victims as well as the harm inflicted upon each of them). Also, at least some of these cases resemble terrorism and other crime scenarios, where it is hard to identify or at least to get a hold of one of the culprits, which moves the compensation matter into the arena of secondary or even tertiary tortfeasors such as financers, facilitators, or the like.[121] Furthermore, while cyber torts may lead to conventional harm, it may also ruin data, and the classification of data losses and alterations in tort law (or in private law as a whole) is still not settled in all jurisdictions.[122]
e) Liability for Emerging Digital Technologies, including AI
49Linked to the former is a comparatively new category of liability issues (if only by name), which is being discussed at EU level, and which at least in part overlaps with the previous category of cyber torts.[123]
50As mentioned above when talking about pending legislative projects in Brussels,[124] recent years have shown increasing activity relating to liability for emerging digital technologies[125] in general and artificial intelligence in particular, at the latest once the European Parliament published its 2017 resolution.[126] There may not be a rush for legislation in the Member States yet, as most of them will presumably wait for a European solution (or at least for definitive signs whether one will come). However, singular steps have already been taken, eg, in the UK (even before Brexit was completed) with the introduction of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018[127] or in Germany with its amendments to the Road Traffic Act (Straßenverkehrsgesetz, StVG), also with an eye to self-driving cars.[128]
51Accidents involving automated vehicles are indeed the most likely scenarios where tort laws will be relevant in practice first,[129] even though the response on a national level will be identical to cases involving conventional cars, at least in those jurisdictions which resolve traffic accidents with strict liability regimes. After all, also at present, these are not triggered by some human conduct steering or operating the car, but by its mere involvement in the accident, leading to liability of its keeper (who can be non-human).[130] Other applications of AI are less likely candidates for classic tort cases as long as they do not cause traditional losses to the bodily integrity or to the property of their victims, which requires some sort of hardware controlled by AI that is able to impact in such a harmful way.[131] To what extent merely digital applications will be relevant in tort law practice is yet open to debate – apart from the fact that some of them will only cause pure economic loss, which is not recoverable in the same way as the afore-mentioned losses in some jurisdictions,[132] others will cause harm of a different kind. If AI is used in recruitment software, for example, any discriminatory outcome that may develop may raise questions of the loss of a chance and/or of emotional harm of those who have been deprived of a job opportunity, apart from triggering other sanctions.
52The above-mentioned consultation launched at the end of 2021[133] not only focused on the PLD, but also (and independently) asked for guidance regarding liability for AI. As already indicated, it is at least imaginable that there will be a separate instrument dealing with liability for AI alongside a (possibly renewed) PLD,[134] even though it is highly unlikely that it will be in the form of a regulation as proposed by the European Parliament.[135] So while there is no case law yet (and possible use cases are still difficult to imagine, at least for the nearer future), there is a considerable degree of likelihood that there will be more to report in five years.
3. Prescription
53Another trend that emerged over the past two decades is a new or at least modernised approach to prescription in the jurisdictions under survey, and it was one of the special topics of the Annual Conference already in 2008.[136] Several countries introduced new legislation in that period.[137] The Eurotort database lists about 160 cases where the limitation of tort claims was at least one key aspect determining the outcome, with some reported over the past five years.[138] The European Group on Tort Law has finalised its project on the topic, culminating in its 2020 publication.[139]
54Despite such high activity both in courts and in parliaments, it remains remarkable how different prescription periods continue to be throughout Europe,[140] with no harmony yet in sight. While the duration of such time periods may seem random to some extent, this would speak even more in favour of some approximation at least in this regard. Still, this is not imminent, and efforts on the EU level have so far failed. The question raised in the 2016 report[141] whether the Howald Moor ruling of the ECtHR[142] will at least have an impact on the ten year period of art 11 PLD is also as yet unanswered.
D. Compensation for Immaterial Harm
1. Recent Developments Regarding Immaterial Harm
55These past five years have shown quite some interesting changes to the laws and/or practice of indemnifying pain and suffering and other non-pecuniary losses in the jurisdictions covered.[143]
56Perhaps the most remarkable change happened in Malta, where immaterial harm resulting from personal injuries was hardly compensated at all until very recently, despite legislative attempts to change that in the past.[144] In 2018, however, Malta introduced a new art 1045 to its Civil Code, which now foresees a maximum award of € 10,000, though in very limited cases.[145]
57In some jurisdictions, the awards for non-pecuniary losses are monitored and effectively steered by recommendations or guidelines published regularly by the competent commissions for consistency reasons. Recent publications of such guidelines include Finland[146] and Ireland.[147]
58In France, an interesting digital project to contribute to an approximation of awards was launched in 2020, the so-called DataJust database, which was conceived to process all decisions of the years 2017 to 2019 where personal injury was at stake. It should have provided courts with guidance to calculate compensation for future cases, ultimately replacing the various (and diverse) guiding tables currently in use.[148] However, the project seems to have stopped at the beginning of 2022, and it is unclear for now what will happen with the data already collected.[149]
2. Maximum Awards in Comparison
59While it is impossible to provide comparative analyses of the amounts awarded for the manifold varieties of pecuniary losses, we at least try to keep track of the pay-outs for immaterial harm. However, any comparison is subject to major caveats (which therefore also apply to the information in the following). To begin with, the jurisdictions under survey have different concepts of non-pecuniary losses.[150] While it is safe to state that all include damages for pain and suffering, the inclusion of losses of amenities already blurs the picture, as some of the detriments may be calculated into an award categorised as material harm.[151] Also, independent separate categories may or may not be added to the grand total qualified as compensation for immaterial harm, including, for example, separately calculated awards for the violation of personality rights or independent heads of damage such as the Italian danno biologico.[152]
60The amounts presented below were quoted by the reporters to this volume when asked about the highest possible award for immaterial harm in the most severe imaginable personal injury cases. Some reporters quoted ranges of amounts rather than a single figure due to the multitude of factors that evidently play a role. This is true for all jurisdictions, though – obviously, courts will primarily look at the specific circumstances of each case and take into account, for example, the age and other specific aspects of the victim’s life before the accident. Some of the awards included into this overview are only available under certain specific liability scenarios such as criminal conduct, intent or at least gross negligence.
61Despite all those stipulations, it is still remarkable how far apart the lowest and the highest possible awards in Europe are. It is even more astonishing, though, that a certain alignment seems to have taken place over the past five years, leading to a rather solid median which a surprisingly high number of jurisdictions seem to acknowledge as adequate.
62As in the 2016 report, the amounts just quoted are now put into perspective with the comparative price level indices in all these countries.[153] One traditional (though presumably no longer equally relevant) argument used in support of calculating compensation for pain and suffering was that the award would allow the victim to finance some alternative pleasures, which may help to out-balance the suffering sustained.
E. Outlook
63As this conference series shows year after year, tort law is a dynamic area of the law, not only adapting to new challenges posed by real-life settings, but also adjusting the assessment of who should bear both old and new risks and of what is deemed ‘just’ compensation for the ensuing losses.
64If I had to summarise the developments of these past 21 years in one word, it would have to be ‘more’: more and new varieties of losses have been recognised as compensable, more claimants were held eligible to claim compensation, and the overall pay-outs clearly increased as well. Tort law throughout Europe has thereby become more victim-friendly, which is not meant as a judgement, but merely as a description of the overall trend.
65While no full-fledged harmonisation of tort law in the books is in sight (apart from some fine-tuning of the already existing product liability regime), it is nevertheless remarkable how certain solutions catch on eventually, even if it may take longer. The best example is the compensability of mere bereavement, which was gradually accepted in almost all jurisdictions covered, even though it ultimately took the legislator in some countries to take the leap.
66When I attended the very first conference in this series, I was not sure how the concept of listening to (at the time still only) 19 country reports in a row would work. I guess all regular guests of the Annual Conference know that my doubts were completely unfounded, even with now 30 reports on a single day. It is truly inspiring from the morning to the evening what kind of cases pop up all over Europe, and how courts resolve them. Returning attendees also see the bigger picture – what may appear curious in one year is suddenly mainstream in the next.
67It is to be hoped that this conference series will continue to provide us with inspiration and food for thought. As said at the beginning, I think every other academic working in a different field of the law envies us for what we have achieved over the past two decades and what will continue to grow out of this accumulated massive treasure trove of experience.
© 2021 Bernhard A Koch, published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Frontmatter
- Preface
- I. Austria
- II. Belgium
- III. Bulgaria
- IV. Croatia
- V. Czech Republic
- VI. Denmark
- VII. England and Wales
- VIII. Estonia
- IX. Finland
- X. France
- XI. Germany
- XII. Greece
- XIII. Hungary
- XIV. Ireland
- XV. Italy
- XVI. Latvia
- XVII. Lithuania
- XVIII. Malta
- XIX. The Netherlands
- XX. Norway
- XXI. Poland
- XXII. Portugal
- XXIII. Romania
- XXIV. Scotland
- XXV. Slovakia
- XXVI. Slovenia
- XXVII. Spain
- XXVIII. Sweden
- XXIX. Switzerland
- XXX. European Union
- XXXI. Israel
- XXXII. The Dynamics of Tort Law in Europe – Two Decades of Accumulated Experience
- Contributors
- Index
- Publications
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Frontmatter
- Preface
- I. Austria
- II. Belgium
- III. Bulgaria
- IV. Croatia
- V. Czech Republic
- VI. Denmark
- VII. England and Wales
- VIII. Estonia
- IX. Finland
- X. France
- XI. Germany
- XII. Greece
- XIII. Hungary
- XIV. Ireland
- XV. Italy
- XVI. Latvia
- XVII. Lithuania
- XVIII. Malta
- XIX. The Netherlands
- XX. Norway
- XXI. Poland
- XXII. Portugal
- XXIII. Romania
- XXIV. Scotland
- XXV. Slovakia
- XXVI. Slovenia
- XXVII. Spain
- XXVIII. Sweden
- XXIX. Switzerland
- XXX. European Union
- XXXI. Israel
- XXXII. The Dynamics of Tort Law in Europe – Two Decades of Accumulated Experience
- Contributors
- Index
- Publications